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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates two related aspects of firms’ choice of HRM 
practices.  The first is why some firms expend a great deal of resources on HRM 
practices for each employee while others spend very little; the second is the extent to 
which firms’ bundles of HRM practices sort into general discrete employment systems.  
In order to empirically address these issues, this dissertation uses an economics-based 
theoretical approach.  The key theoretical link to economics is to treat HRM as a separate 
factor input in the production process, which allows me to derive an HRM input demand 
function.  This function expresses the firm’s per employee expenditures on HRM and 
their choice of HRM system as a function of prices and internal and external firm 
characteristics.  Ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares and linear quantile 
analysis are used to empirically estimate the HRM demand function using a unique 
dataset of several hundred firms collected by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA).  The 
regression equation is found to be statistically significant, implying firms do have an 
identifiable demand for HRM practices.  Second, there are nine independent variables 
which are found to be stable determinants of the demand for per employee expenditures 
on HRM practices.  Regarding the existence of discrete employment systems, cluster 
analysis is used to determine if the sets of HRM practices adopted by these firms sort into 
identifiable types of HRM systems. The results show that there is a discrete set of four 
HRM systems; however, the HRM demand function does not predict which system a firm 
will choose.  
 
  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms use human resource management (HRM) to coordinate their employees and 
administer personnel policies and practices.  HRM is implemented in firms through a 
variety of methods such as selection, training, compensation and employee relations.  By 
utilizing these HRM practices, firms are able to staff and organize their workforces so 
that they can function as the labor input in their production processes.  While the labor 
input is a standard element of every firm’s production process, the level and 
configuration of HRM used to coordinate the labor input typically varies considerably 
among firms.   
One way of quantifying the variation in the firm’s use of HRM practices is by 
observing its per capita expenditures on HRM.  For instance, all firms make expenditures 
on HRM practices to recruit, select, train and compensate each of their employees.  
However, some firms’ production processes require a labor input that can be coordinated 
by spending relatively little on these HRM practices, while others require large 
expenditures.  These differences in expenditure arise from a variety of internal and 
external factors.  Examples of the former include the level of firm-specific training 
required by the technology of production and the degree to which creating incentives 
through compensation policies can improve employee productivity; an example of the 
latter includes the supply of workers with needed skills and cognitive abilities in the 
external labor market.   
1 
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A second dimension of variation in the use of HRM is the composition of the 
bundle of practices chosen by firms.  That is, firms have numerous choices among 
specific selection, training, compensation, and employee relations techniques and they 
must decide how to optimally mix and match them.  Specific HRM practices may be 
substitutes, complements or unrelated, and the actual case will strongly influence the 
configuration of the HRM package.  In general we expect the HRM bundle chosen by 
each firm to depend on many of the same internal and external factors that influence its 
choice of HRM expenditures per person.  For example, if one firm’s production process 
necessitates on the job training while another firm’s does not, then there is reason to think 
that the one firm will not only spend more on training, but also emphasize recruitment 
and compensation practices that promote long tenure and organizational commitment. 
Theorizing the choices firms make with regard to HRM has interested researchers 
for many years in several disciplines and fields, including management, psychology, 
economics and industrial relations.  However, at present, no model or theory of this 
choice process has been developed that is either analytical or commands widespread 
acceptance.  As a consequence, the purpose of this dissertation is to fill this void.  The 
primary contribution is to provide an empirical test of an economics-based approach to 
understanding cross-sectional differences in HRM expenditures among firms.  The 
theoretical link to economics is to treat HRM expenditures as a separate factor input in 
the firm’s production process, which allows for the derivation of an HRM demand curve 
and input demand function.  An approximation of the HRM demand curve will be 
estimated using linear regression analysis; if the coefficients on key variables are 
statistically significant then we will have made progress in identifying stable 
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determinants of this particular demand relationship.  Additionally, these results will 
provide support for a deductive, economic theory of demand for HRM.  Finally, the sign 
and magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the specified independent variables 
predict both the firm’s aggregate demand for HRM as well as its demand for expenditures 
on individual HRM practices.  
The second contribution of this dissertation is to empirically examine whether 
firms adopt distinguishable bundles of HRM practices.  To date, the literature only has 
studies that develop theoretical presentations on the choice of optimal HRM 
configurations.  Part of my contribution in this dissertation is to empirically test some of 
these theoretical predictions.  To do so, we use cluster analysis to determine if sets of 
HRM practices among a large group of firms sort into identifiable types of employment 
systems.  We also attempt to provide evidence of the firm-specific and environmental 
characteristics that lead firms to choose a particular system of HRM practices.  
 
The Research Questions 
 
This dissertation explores both lines of inquiry outlined above, the one being 
examining firm differences in demand for HRM and the other identifying the more 
common clusters of HRM practices.  The inspiration motivating this research comes from 
observing frequency distributions describing the use of HRM practices in firms.  As will 
be demonstrated below, the two topics are complementary since they describe different 
dimensions of the HRM frequency distribution. 
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The Firm’s Demand for HRM 
 In practice there is considerable variation in the number of HRM practices used 
by firms as well as the level of expenditures that firms choose to allocate to such 
practices.  The first illustration of this cross-sectional variation is found in What Workers 
Want (Freeman and Rogers 1999).  Here, the authors present the firm-level usage of ten 
HRM practices obtained from a 1994 survey of a nationally representative sample of over 
two thousand workers.  In the survey, the respondents provide information on whether or 
not their organization utilizes each of a large and diverse set of HRM practices.  Then the 
authors create an index reflecting a ratio of the number of practices found in the firm out 
of the possible ten.  The frequency distribution generated by plotting this measure of the 
use of HRM in firms using their dataset is shown Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of the Demand for HRM Practices 
 
Source: (Freeman and Rogers 2006,124) 
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We immediately notice in Figure 1 that the surveyed firms made different choices 
concerning their use of these ten HRM practices.  In fact, the distribution of the use of 
HRM practices in firms demonstrates a bell shape with considerable skewness in the 
right-hand tail.  Some firms use zero of the HRM practices; others use all of them, but 
most lie somewhere in between the two extremes, in the center of the distribution.   
The notion that firms differ in their HRM choices is confirmed by a more recent 
dataset collected by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA).  This unique dataset, which is 
integral in conducting the empirical analyses in my dissertation, also provides 
information that allows me to plot a slightly different specification of the HRM frequency 
distribution.  Instead of plotting a summation of individual HRM practices, the BNA 
dataset allows me to plot data on each firm’s HRM expenditures per capita.  This is 
shown in Figure 2.  Like Figure 1, it also generates a bell-shaped frequency distribution 
with a skewed right-hand tail.  As is shown in Figure 2, expenditures for human resource 
activities and programs range from a low of $152 per employee to a high of $8,709 per 
employee among the surveyed organizations.  However, these small or very large outlays 
are the exception.  Roughly half of employers—those in the middle range between the 
25th percentile and the 75th percentile—spend between $615 per employee and $2,069 
per employee for HR activities.  The choice to focus on expenditures as the method of 
quantifying the utilization of HRM is detailed in the next section of this chapter; 
however, it should be noted that if one plots the number of formalized HRM practices in 
the firm using BNA data, it also shows a wide range of demand.  Figure 3 plots the 
frequency distribution of HRM practices in firms in the BNA dataset.  As can be seen in 
this diagram, the distribution is bell shaped, without being skewed to the right.   
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Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of the Firm Demand for HRM Expenditures 
 
Source: (Joseph 2005; Joseph 2006) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency Distribution of the Number of HRM Practices Used in Each Firm 
 
Source: (Joseph 2005; Joseph 2006) 
 
 
A third data source, the 1998 British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys, 
also yields a frequency distribution with a bell-shape suggesting this empirical pattern is 
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general and robust even across countries.  Here, the use of HRM is measured by an index 
variable in the same way as Freeman and Rogers, with the exception that thirteen 
practices are surveyed rather than ten.  The frequency distribution plotted with these data 
demonstrates a bell-shaped distribution, as is the case in the previous two figures albeit 
without noticeable skewness in the right-hand tail.  The frequency distribution is shown 
in Figure A.1 of this dissertation’s Appendix. 
 From observing these HRM frequency distributions, it is reasonable to infer that 
firms choose to vary the level of HRM they use to coordinate their labor input.  This 
implies that there is unlikely to be a universal ‘best practice’ HRM bundle upon which 
firms are converging.  Rather, firms appear to make a conscious decision to use HRM at 
low, intermediate and high levels.  One such point is illustrated by point A in Figure 2.  
The associated question that the author addresses in this dissertation is: what determines 
why the firm locates at point A and not at some other point on the distribution?   
From an economics perspective, one presumes that this distribution is an outcome 
of the firm’s profit maximization decision, and in particular, its benefit/cost calculation 
with respect to the HRM factor input.  Surprisingly, this straightforward and rather 
obvious application of standard microeconomic production theory has not yet been 
utilized in the HRM literature, and not even in the more analytically advanced literature 
of Personnel Economics (although the latter does emphasize the adoption of profit 
maximizing personnel practices).  Using a profit maximizing framework, the author will 
show that it is possible to derive an HRM input demand curve and input demand 
function, and that these can be used to locate the point on the HRM frequency 
distribution where the firm chooses to position itself. 
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In practice, HRM demand curves are likely to vary among firms because most 
organizations have unique internal and environmental characteristics that influence the 
benefits/costs of HRM practices.  As the demand curve shifts from firm to firm, it creates 
variation in the optimal use of HRM, allowing me to identify points on the HRM 
frequency distribution and, hence, its overall shape.1  Thus, one purpose of this 
dissertation is to derive the input demand function and HRM demand curve and then 
estimate them empirically through the use of linear regression analysis.  Using those 
results, one can explain the frequency distribution that describes the observed use of 
HRM in firms by using a few key firm-specific internal and environmental factors, for 
example firm size and industry, to predict the optimal level of demand on HRM 
practices.2    
 
Identifying Alternative HRM Systems in Firms 
 Even if one is able to predict the location of a firm on the HRM frequency 
distribution, this result does not fully characterize the firm’s demand for HRM.  The 
reason is because firms can choose different bundles of specific HRM practices even 
though they are located at the same point on the distribution.  The implication of this 
shortcoming is best explained using the following demonstrative example.  What if there 
is a group of firms that choose to spend roughly the same amount on HRM practices in 
aggregate, but implement different HRM systems by focusing these expenditures on 
different HRM practices?  In this case, measuring the demand for HRM using the level of 
                                                 
1 One advantageous attribute of this method of modeling the demand for HRM expenditures is that it can 
explain the variation of demand for a single firm over time or among many firms at a given point in time.  
2 The specific variables that explain the firms’ demand for expenditures on HRM practices are detailed in 
Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
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expenditures would imply that these firms are equivalent (e.g., low, moderate or high 
demand), yet the HRM systems that they use vary.  As a result, one would err in 
assuming that firms with the same level of expenditures always make the same choices 
when it comes to their management of human resources.   
Using the BNA dataset it is possible to demonstrate the existence of this situation.  
To illustrate, suppose we choose point A on the frequency distribution shown in Figure 2.  
At point A, there are three firms in the dataset that have nearly the exact same 
expenditure on HRM practices ($1,010, $1,013 and $1,014); however, each of these 
organizations chooses to allocate funds to its specific HRM practices differently, as 
shown below in Table 1.  In this table, the HRM systems of the three firms are compared.  
In order to make this comparison, the percentage of a firm’s HRM expenditures that go to 
each of nine HRM practices are compared to the average rates for the entire dataset.  If 
the percentage of expenditures allocated to an HRM practice is within half a standard 
deviation of the dataset’s mean percentage of expenditures, then the firm is characterized 
as having a moderate demand for the HRM practice in question.  If the percentage of the 
firm’s expenditures on the HRM practice is half of a standard deviation greater (less) than 
the mean for the dataset, then the firm is identified as having a high (low) demand for the 
HRM practice in question. 
 
Table 1. The Allocation Resources by Firms with Similar Total HRM Expenditures 
Type of HRM Practice  
Firm 1 
($1,010) 
Firm 2 
($1,013) 
Firm 3 
($1,014) 
Recruitment High Moderate Moderate 
Training Moderate High Moderate 
Compensation Low Low Moderate 
Benefits High Moderate High 
Employee Relations Moderate High Moderate 
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External Relations Low Low Moderate 
Performance Management Low High High 
OSHA Moderate Low Moderate 
Strategic Planning Low Low Moderate 
Source: Author’s calculations using data collected from (Joseph 2005; Joseph 2006). 
 
 
In examining this table it is clear that all three firms have selected different HRM 
bundles (employment systems).  For example, Firm 1 and Firm 2 choose to spend a small 
proportion of their HRM budgets on some HRM practices, a moderate amount on others, 
and a large proportion on the rest; however, their systems of HRM practices are clearly 
not the same.  In fact, these two firms only share a common level of expenditures for 
three HRM practices; administering compensation, external relations and performance 
management.  In contrast to these firms, Firm 3 chooses a pattern of expenditures in 
which all HRM practices receive a moderate percentage of expenditures, except for 
benefits administration and performance management activities.  Relative to the other 
firms, these two HRM practices receive a high proportion of the total HRM budget 
indicating that they are relatively important to the successful management of the firm’s 
human resources.  Thus, from observing the decisions of the three firms located at point 
A in Figure 2, it becomes apparent that firms that share a common level of expenditures 
on HRM practices may adopt quite different systems of HRM practices. 
This observation provides the second line of empirical inquiry in this dissertation.  
In particular, the author seeks to answer two related issues regarding HRM bundles.  
First, is there a common HRM system that all firms use, or do they choose different 
systems?  Second, what factors lead a firm to select one of these HRM systems over the 
rest?  In order to answer the first of these two questions, this dissertation utilizes a cluster 
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analysis that classifies firms based on how they choose to apportion their total HRM 
expenditures to the various practices they select.  In the end, the results of this analysis 
identify a set of HRM systems into which all firms can be categorized.   Using this 
information, it is possible to answer the second question stated above by identifying the 
firm-specific and environmental characteristics that are associated with each cluster of 
firms.  Thus, the findings from this analysis complement the information gained from 
answering the first of my empirical research questions.  With the results from both lines 
of inquiry it is possible to predict a firm’s level of expenditures on HRM, as well as the 
way in which the firm’s expenditures aggregate into distinct HRM bundles. 
 
Research Design 
 
This dissertation relies heavily upon a unique dataset containing detailed firm 
level information from 2005 on 381 firms collected by the Bureau of National Affairs 
(BNA).  The quality and depth of information on firms’ HRM activities in the BNA 
dataset is superior to other sources, and is integral to estimating the empirical models that 
in this dissertation.   A more thorough explanation of the dataset is found in Chapter IV. 
 
The Firm’s Demand for HRM 
One notable aspect of this study is that it analyzes the demand for HRM as a 
factor input in the standard neoclassical model of production, just as labor demand has 
traditionally been evaluated (Hamermesh 1993).  This approach to evaluating the 
research question is quite different than prior research in management which was focused 
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on the HRM-firm performance relationship (Paauwe and Boselie 2005).  Indeed, it 
changes the line of causality from that which is used in management models.  That is, 
management studies look at HRM as a predictor of differences in firm profits while this 
dissertation looks at differences in prices as well as firm and environmental 
characteristics as a predictor of a firm’s demand for HRM.   
In order to empirically estimate the firm’s HRM input demand function correctly, 
the first issue which must be addressed is how to quantify the demand for HRM.  While 
an index reflecting the number of practices used in a firm has traditionally been the way 
of communicating its use of HRM, the dependent variable used in this model 
specification is the log of a firm’s HRM expenditures.  There is no doubt that the number 
of practices and the level of expenditures are both able to indicate the level of demand for 
HRM in an organization; however, the latter measure is preferable.  By lumping all HRM 
practices into a single composite score with each practice taking the same value, it is 
possible to overstate the presence of HRM in some firms while not recognizing the 
efforts of others.  For example, assuming that placing an anonymous complaints box in 
the lunch area is the same as implementing a formal employee involvement program 
where workers meet regularly with managers could be as erroneous as treating two 
capital goods such as a tractor and a horse-drawn plow the same way.   
As for the independent variables used in the HRM demand function, this 
dissertation specifies variables such as the size of the firm’s workforce, wages, non-labor 
operating costs, the demographic, occupational and knowledge characteristics of the 
workforce, the sector in which the firm operates (public/non-profit/private), the level of 
the surveyed department in the organization, union activity, labor and product market 
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characteristics, the strategic role of the HR department within the firm, and the degree to 
which a firm’s ideology favors the provision of a high level of HRM activities for its 
employees.3  
Regression and quantile analyses are used to empirically estimate the demand for 
HRM demand in this dissertation.  Both of these methods are employed as they work 
together to give a thorough evaluation of the firm’s demand for expenditures on HRM 
practices.  In particular, the quantile analysis is able to check to see if the OLS estimates 
are correct for the entire sample population.  When the OLS estimates are not valid, they 
are replaced by the results from the quantile analysis.  The reason that the results from the 
quantile analysis are not used exclusively in this dissertation is that OLS results are more 
precise and it is more straightforward to draw inference based on OLS.   
Thus, the first step taken in the empirical evaluation of the HRM input demand 
function is to estimate it using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression.  In OLS the 
estimated coefficients connote the behavioral responses of a sample-weighted average or 
typical firm to changes in the explanatory variables.  While informative, OLS results are 
not necessarily representative of all firms.  In contrast to OLS which only evaluates the 
covariates at the conditional mean, the key aspect of quantile analysis is that the influence 
of the covariates on the demand for HRM is evaluated at different points along the 
conditional distribution, called quantiles.  This method begins by breaking down the 
dataset into one hundred groups that categorize firms according to their level of 
                                                 
3 Several of these variables  (i.e., wages and skill of workers, occupational composition of the workers) are 
arguably outcome variables that are determined in conjunction with HRM practices.  However, here these 
are treated sequentially, with the structure of the workforce being determined first and then the HRM 
practices. 
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expenditures on HRM practices.  Then, once this has been done, OLS is used to evaluate 
the behaviors of each group on its own.   
In doing this, it is possible to see if the covariate has a stronger or weaker impact 
on the demand for HRM in a given region of the distribution by observing if the 
coefficients are getting larger or smaller in magnitude across quantiles (i.e., as the HRM 
expenditures increase).  If the magnitudes of the coefficients do not have an increasing or 
decreasing trend, then one can say that the OLS results are reasonable for all firms.  
However, if the opposite is true, then the OLS results only predict the HRM expenditures 
of firms whose expenditures are similar to the conditional mean of the sample population.  
In the latter situation, the estimated results of the quantile analysis are utilized since they 
are able to explain the behavior of all firms whereas OLS cannot.  Thus, the quantile 
analysis complements the explanatory power of OLS results in that it identifies which 
independent variables in the HRM input demand function have coefficients that are 
estimated correctly by OLS.  In addition, quantile analysis provides reliable estimates on 
the explanatory variables on interest when those produced using OLS do not fully 
characterize all of the firms in the sample population. 
After, estimating a model that predicts the firm’s aggregate expenditures on HRM 
practices, this dissertation also disaggregates the analysis by looking at expenditures on 
individual HRM practices.  The purpose of this is to investigate whether the influence of 
the independent variables varies across HRM practice types.  For instance, is the change 
in effort from a marginal increase in the level of education of a firm’s workforce different 
for training expenditures relative to benefits administration?  To determine if such 
relationships exist, nine regressions are estimated where the dependent variable is defined 
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as the percentage of total per capita expenditures on each of the following HRM 
practices: recruitment, training, compensation administration, benefits administration, 
employee relations, external relations, personnel management, health and safety 
activities, and strategic planning.   
 
Identifying the HRM Systems Used in Firms 
The second course of inquiry explored in this dissertation aims to identify specific 
systems or bundles of HRM practices across firms.  To do this type of analysis, we 
perform a cluster analysis that groups firms according to their observed use of various 
HRM practices.  The methodology used to perform the cluster analysis in this dissertation 
is conducted in a similar, albeit more sophisticated, fashion to other studies such as 
Manufacturing Advantage: Why High-Performance Work Systems Pay Off (Appelbaum, 
Bailey, et al. 2000).4    
In this dissertation, firms are clustered according to the percentage of their HRM 
budget that they allocate to each of the nine categories of HRM practices mentioned 
above using a method that combines hierarchical and K-clustering (non-hierarchical) 
techniques.  Even though the K-clustering procedure is more precise, both techniques are 
needed because they work together to produce the final results.  Performing K-clustering 
requires the researcher to manually define a point of reference that serves as the starting 
point of each cluster, called a centroid, and the number of clusters that should be formed.  
The preferred way to specify centroids and the number of clusters is through the use of a 
hierarchical technique like agglomeration clustering.  Agglomeration clustering works by 
starting with the assumption that each firm is its own cluster.  Next, a measure of 
                                                 
4 See Chapter V for an outline of the research method used in this analysis. 
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dissimilarity is calculated between each cluster; based on these measures the two most 
similar clusters are combined.  This procedure continues until all firms are partitioned 
into a single group that classifies all firms.  After this process is complete, a centroid is 
defined by observing the characteristics of the mean firm in each cluster.  That is, the 
centroid is a vector of nine percentages that show the way firms in each cluster distribute 
their HRM budget on average.  Using these centroids as points of reference, a 
mathematical K-clustering procedure that minimizes intra-cluster dissimilarity called the 
K-means technique is used to cluster firms according to their system of HRM.  In the end, 
the combination of these two clustering methodologies identifies a handful of systems of 
HRM practices that can be used to characterize all firms. 
By using a cluster analysis to neatly place firms into a small number of 
generalized groups we are able to derive insights into the types of HRM systems that 
firms adopt.  This is done by observing, in each category, which HRM activities are 
implemented with relatively high, moderate, and low intensity.  By grouping the elements 
of HRM that are implemented with a high level of intensity, we can identify which types 
of practices have complementary properties in each cluster of firms.  Next, once the 
analysis is completed, an evaluation of the internal and external characteristics typical of 
the firms found in each cluster provides added information on their demand for a 
particular HRM system.   
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Plan of Study 
 
The rest of this dissertation is organized into the following chapters. Chapter II 
provides a review of theoretical approaches to understanding firm HRM choices already 
found in the literature.  Chapter III presents a detailed account of the theoretical model 
that is used to explain the firm’s demand for expenditures on HRM practices and its 
choice of HRM system.  Then, Chapter IV describes the dataset and methodology used to 
estimate the factor input model and presents results from estimating the model.  
Following this, Chapter V details the methodology used to perform the cluster analysis 
and presents its results.  Finally, Chapter VI will present conclusions as well as suggested 
avenues for furthering this body of research.  
 CHAPTER II 
THE FIRM’S USE OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The previous chapter described the two empirical research questions that are 
explored in this dissertation: first, explanation of the individual firm’s position in the 
HRM frequency distribution and, second, evaluation of the extent to which firms’ HRM 
practices cluster into distinct “employment systems”.  To address these issues,  this 
dissertation will present and use a theoretical framework derived from the 
microeconomic theory of production.  To better appreciate the contribution of this model, 
and the empirical analysis we conduct based on it, one needs some knowledge and 
perspective on the existing literature as it bears on employment systems and the firm’s 
choice of HRM practices.  Accordingly, this chapter presents a summary review of the 
relevant literature.  
 
Personnel Economics 
 
 Personnel Economics (PE) emerged in the 1980s and has grown into a substantial 
subfield of labor economics.  The goal of PE is to use traditional microeconomics to 
explain various factors of firm’s people management policies, practices and systems.  In 
effect, PE extends economics from the operation of external labor markets (ELMs) to the 
operation of internal labor markets (ILMs).  In all cases PE assumes that agents attempt 
to optimize, although their behavior need not be super-rational.  Worker output is not 
fixed, but varies with effort and worker interaction in different ways depending on a 
18 
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firm’s output and production process.  For example, optimal pay may be compressed 
relative to marginal products in production processes requiring cooperation among 
workers, while being dispersed relative to marginal products in firms where competition 
among workers produces highly valued outputs.  Pay, promotion, and other workplace 
outcomes are often based on relative rather than absolute performance.  And PE attempts 
to be not only descriptive but also proscriptive (normative); that is, it both helps explain 
how firms differ in the way they structure workplace governance and compensation and 
provides advice on how they should structure these based on their circumstances.  To get 
a better sense of how PE addresses the firm’s HRM choices it makes sense to summarize 
several of the literature’s leading theories.  
One aspect of the employment relationship that commands sizeable attention in 
the literature is the way in which a firm chooses to compensate its managerial workers.  
For instance, many large companies currently give employees large increases in pay and 
benefits when they are promoted to the upper echelons of the firm’s hierarchy.  One 
implication of this trend is that an employee’s salary can increase dramatically due to a 
promotion even though the value they add to the firm may not change much from one day 
to the next.  This seems to violate standard human capital theory which has traditionally 
predicted that employees’ wages reflect their marginal productivity to the firm.  In 
contrast to Human Capital theory, PE uses Tournament theory to explain the large 
discrete increases in pay that accompany promotions to the top levels of a firm’s 
hierarchy (Lazear and Oyer 2007).   
Tournament theory argues that the compensation structure for large firms is 
similar to a golf or tennis tournament where the earnings structure is used to motivate 
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athletes to perform at the highest level possible.  This is done by making the winnings of 
the top performer notably higher than for athletes that finish in sixth or seventh place, and 
far greater than the winnings of the people whose performance leaves them in the middle 
of the pack.  Relating this framework to the business environment, Tournament theory 
suggests that the level of compensation received by executives/upper management in 
large firms is used to motivate employees at lower levels to aspire to be promoted to such 
a position.  By making the reward for being promoted very high, firms are able to create a 
competitive environment that motivates young managers to work very hard in hopes of 
being chosen for promotion.  This leads to higher firm performance as the firm receives a 
higher level of output from all the young managers who are vying for the promotion, but 
only has to reward a few of them in the future with costly executive compensation 
packages (Neilson 2007).   
A second aspect of compensation that is explained by PE is the compression of 
wages in non-managerial positions in firms.  Standard neoclassical microeconomics 
predicts that employers offer prospective employees a wage during the hiring process that 
reflects their predicted value to the firm; however, in practice, some firms choose to pay 
highly productive workers less than their share of the output while over-compensating 
workers with low productivity.  To be more specific, pay compression occurs when firms 
maintain a variance in their payroll which is less than the variance in the performance of 
their workers.  To explain this aspect of firm behavior, PE theorizes that a compressed 
schedule of wages are chosen purposefully by firms to create an environment that fosters 
employee teamwork and cooperation and thus improves productivity and profit (Lazear 
and Shaw 2007).  Lazear (1999) tests this theory by looking at the variance in the wages 
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and performance of firms.  The results of the regressions in his empirical study show 
suggestive proof that firms promote compressed wages to develop a work environment 
characterized by compliance and coordination, which leads to increased profits.   
The main contribution of PE to evaluating the behavior of firms is that it uses the 
fundamental principles of neoclassical microeconomics, most fundamentally profit 
maximization, to address the ways in which individual HRM practices such as 
compensation are and are not structured by firms based on differing benefits and costs.  
While this does provide both a general framework for analysis and helps researchers 
understand the specific choices that firms make when dealing with a particular HRM 
practice, PE researchers have not evaluated the firm’s aggregate use of HRM.  Therefore, 
one significant contribution of this dissertation is that it adds to PE by empirically 
justifying a theory that can address the firm’s overall use of all its HRM practices, and 
predict the firm’s location on the HRM frequency distribution shown in Figure 2.5 
 
Human Resource Management and Organizational Performance 
 
Traditionally, management research assumes that investing in HRM improves 
organizational performance which, in turn, earns additional profits for the firm.  This line 
of thinking implies a line of causality from HRM to performance (i.e., 
HRM→Performance) (Huselid 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, et al. 1997; Becker and Huselid 
1998; Marsden 1999; Boselie, Dietz, et al. 2005; Hesketh and Fleetwood 2006).  As a 
                                                 
5 This conclusion assumes that the HRM categorical expenditure data from the BNA survey provides (at a 
minimum) ordinal measures of HRM adoption within each category. Because PE scholars focus on the 
specific structure of personnel policies (say the sequencing of pay over a career for a given present value), 
some might argue that analysis of the BNA expenditure data do not specifically address many of the issues 
addressed by PE. 
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result of this assumption, the empirical literature is dominated by articles which seek to 
test its implication by using a measure of firm performance as the dependent variable 
while specifying various HRM practices and relevant control variables as independent 
explanatory covariates.   
Since the mid-1990s, some trends have emerged in this burgeoning literature.  For 
example, researchers tend to define firm performance using measures such as labor 
productivity, turnover, profits and the scrap rate (Boselie, Dietz, et al. 2005).  In some 
studies, the HRM practice variables are entered individually, while in other studies some 
form of aggregated measure is used as is done in this study.  In addition, certain control 
variables have become standard in this literature, some of which are used in the 
estimating equation specified in Chapter IV.  Table 2 lists the most popular control 
variables, and includes information on the frequency with which the control variable was 
used in the literature between 1994 and 2003.   
 
Table 2. Commonly Used Control Variables  
Control Variable Incidence* 
Firm size** 62% 
Industry or Sector**  39% 
Union presence/coverage** 31% 
Firm Age 24% 
Gender of Workforce** 19% 
Technology** 14% 
Employee Age 13% 
Worker Tenure/Experience 12% 
Capital Intensity** 10% 
Education** 9% 
Foreign Ownership 9% 
Subsidiary** 9% 
*Incidence is calculated at the proportion of the 104 studies written in 
this field between 1994 and 2003 that use the control variable. 
**Used as a covariate in the model evaluated in this dissertation  
 Source: (Boselie, Dietz, et al. 2005) 
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For over a decade, the theoretical core of HRM research has assumed that 
investing in HRM practices leads to outcomes which improve the performance of firms.  
Consequently, empirical evaluations of the HRM-Performance relationship have 
specified models where HRM is an independent variable that serves as a predictor of firm 
performance.  This approach, however, begs a fundamental question which an economist 
is trained to spot.  That is, it would appear that the HRM variables are, in fact, choice 
variables for the firm, making it illegitimate to put them on the right-hand side of the 
profit regression equation as exogenous independent variables.  Restated, standard micro 
theory suggests that the goal of firms is to maximize profits, and therefore, firms 
accordingly choose their optimal amount of HRM much the same way that they choose 
their capital and labor inputs.  This perspective suggests that the Performance = f (HRM) 
type regression is mis-specified, as the HRM variables are themselves endogenous choice 
variables.  One serious consequence of the HRM variables being endogenously specified 
is that the regressions will yield biased results.  This calls into question the conclusions 
based on the results of past studies which have hypothesized a positive relationship 
between HRM and firm performance.  That is, it may well be the case that firms using 
particular HRM practices perform at higher levels, but it need not follow that other firms 
should adopt such practices.  If HRM choices are endogenous then one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that most firms are adopting (or have a tendency to adopt) HRM practices that 
are optimal for their specific circumstances, only some of which can be observed 
(controlled) by researchers. 
A second weakness in this field is that researchers tend to make conclusions using 
theories that are inductive and normatively driven.  Most management studies, for 
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example, claim that a “high performance” HRM approach (e.g., teams, employee 
involvement, pay for performance, etc.) is the profit maximizing approach, but this is 
often asserted more on the basis of what successful firms have done rather than what a 
value-free theory predicts a firm will do.  Following the suggestions of Friedman (1953), 
a preferred method for conducting research in the field of HRM is to take a positive 
approach where a canonical model is used to deduce and derive hypotheses.   
Pfeffer (1994) is one example of an inductive study in the HRM literature.  In his 
oft-cited book, Pfeffer identifies the HRM practices used in a few of the most successful 
companies from 1972-1992, and then generalizes from these cases to propose the best 
HRM practices for all firms based on these observations.  The broad conclusions which 
are reached by interviewing executives from a handful of firms in Becker and Huselid 
(1999) is a second example of inductive reasoning in the HRM literature.  A more recent 
study that continues the trend of inductive reasoning is found in Farndale and Paauwe 
(2007).  In this study, the authors establish how institutional and competitive factors 
impact the use of HRM in multinational firms using data from fourteen firms that operate 
in a total of seventeen countries.  The main problem with using an inductive approach is 
that it uses individual observations to make generalizations which might not actually be 
appropriate for all firms in the economy.  In practice, consultants from Mercer’s human 
capital strategy group validate this problem.  They find that a system of ‘best practices’ 
“…works perfectly in some types of businesses, [though] other sectors are simply not 
suited to it” (Cooper 2000, 30).   
The above identified problems notwithstanding, the HRM literature has valuable 
insights we can learn from and use in this dissertation.  To this end, this section provides 
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a closer review of several lines of inquiry that have been developed within the HRM 
literature. 
 
Strategy and the Resource Based View 
Within the HRM literature, the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm is a 
commonly used theory which explains how firms choose their inputs.  Edith Penrose’s 
1959 article on The Theory of the Growth of the Firm was a ‘coming out’ of sorts for 
identifying firm resources as a source of competitive advantage (Fahy and Smithee 
1999).  However, it was a quarter century later when Wernerfelt (1984) first provided a 
concrete theoretical assertion of a RBV which incorporated HRM practices as ‘firm 
resources’.  Rather than focusing on the external characteristics of the industry in which 
firms operate, Wernerfelt proposes a shift in the research paradigm governing the 
analysis of firm behavior and comparative advantage towards the study of the internal 
resources used by the organization in production (Wright, Dunford, et al. 2001).  
In his oft-cited article on this subject, Barney (1991) provides the benchmark 
explanation of the school of thought behind the RBV of the firm.  He notes that firm 
resources (e.g., assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information 
and knowledge) can be a sustainable source of competitive advantage for firms as long as 
the resource meets four conditions.  First, the resource should provide the firm with value 
by improving efficiency and effectiveness in production.  Next, the resource should be 
rare among competitors since there is no competitive advantage gained by firms if they 
are all doing the same thing.  The third required characteristic of the resource is that it be 
perfectly inimitable.  The inimitability of the resource can be due to historical conditions, 
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causal ambiguity or social context.  Finally, the resource must be unable to be substituted 
by any other product found in the market.   
Using this definition of the RBV of the firm, it is reasonable to think that HRM 
practices can work to improve profits and provide sustained competitive advantage in 
both the short and long run (Becker and Huselid 1998; Lockett and Thompson 2001).  
The germane aspect of the RBV to this dissertation is that firms that make HRM a true 
‘resource’ (i.e., source of competitive advantage) will necessarily use HRM in different 
ways because of the specific requirements outlined by Barney (1991).  Since systems of 
HRM are rare, inimitable and have no substitutes, there have to be differences in the 
systems used between firms by definition.  In addition, it is logical to expect that firm 
expenditures will fluctuate according to the specific package of HRM practices chosen by 
each firm.  Thus, the RBV provides a theoretical foundation that predicts the variation in 
firm expenditures on HRM and the use of specific practices between firms; however, this 
is only true for those firms whose labor input comprises a true source of competitive 
advantage.  Unfortunately, the RBV does not explain the variation in demand for HRM 
expenditures or the choice of HRM system for those firms whose competitive advantage 
is found in their technology of production, differentiated products, or a scarce natural 
resource. 
 
Contingency Theory 
While the RBV is one basis for HRM theorizing, there are also other theoretical 
frameworks used within the HRM literature.  The next most popular way of explaining 
the firm’s use of HRM is contingency theory, which is more consistent with economic 
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theory and the approach in this dissertation.  It maintains that a firm’s choice of HRM 
practices is contingent on its internal organizational characteristics and its external 
economic, political and social environment.  Based on these characteristics, firms make 
HRM choices so that their HRM practices fit well into the firm’s internal and external 
environment.   
The key concept in contingency theory is fit.  There are two components of fit that 
influence the firm’s choice of HRM practices:  vertical fit and horizontal fit.  Achieving 
vertical fit requires firms to complement their overall strategic plan by designing HRM 
practices in a way that best aligns the interests and behaviors of workers with the values 
and needs of the company (Werbel and DeMarie 2005; Lepak and Snell 2007, 219) .  On 
the other hand, horizontal fit is attained when HRM practices are implemented in a 
complementary way so that they work together towards a common goal.  
A firm’s HRM strategy should also be geared towards the economic, political and 
social conditions of the external environment in which it operates.  The key aspect of 
external fit is to make HRM choices that allow the firm to remain flexible so that it can 
accommodate for changes in these conditions should they occur (Wright and Snell 1998).  
Some external contingencies which firms might consider when choosing their demand for 
HRM include the availability and variability of qualified workers in the labor market, 
employee turnover, social norms, and the degree of government intervention and/or 
oversight.   
Rather than viewing contingency theory and the RBV of the firm as being 
separate entities, some authors have attempted to integrate the two views of the firm into 
a single model.  They postulate that there exists some equilibrium “level of fit” for each 
 
28 
 
firm and its HRM practices, and this fit is contingent on how the HRM practices create 
and/or support the firm’s competitive advantage (Wright and McMahan 1992; Wright 
and Snell 1998; Wright, Dunford, et al. 2001; Boselie, Dietz, et al. 2005; Werbel and 
DeMarie 2005).   
As it pertains to this dissertation, the most important implication drawn from 
contingency theory is the role that a firm’s internal and external characteristics play in its 
HRM decisions.  By observing these firm and environmental attributes, it is possible to 
predict if a firm will choose to make large, moderate or small investments in HRM 
practices.  In some firms, the internal and external characteristics of the firm will allow it 
to profitably engage in a very broad range of HRM activities.  In these types of firms it is 
rational to expect a very high level of HRM expenditures.  As a result, these firms would 
find themselves in the right-hand tail of a frequency distribution that plots the level of 
firm expenditures on HRM, as shown in Figure 2.  Other workforces will justify little or 
no investments in HRM and find themselves in the left-hand tail of the frequency 
distribution.  Of course, most of firms employ a diverse workforce that caters to a 
moderate level of expenditure, which causes these firms to be located in the middle of the 
distribution.   
 
Ability, Motivation and Opportunity to Participate  
A third theory which has received much attention is Ability, Motivation and 
Opportunity (AMO) theory.  This theory claims that firms will choose HRM practices 
that improve employees’ motivation, and their knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) 
since these lead to higher productivity and profit (Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. 2000; Bailey, 
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Berg, et al. 2001).  However, AMO does not address the choices made by firms where 
there is no capacity or opportunity for additional worker effort to improve profits.  In 
these situations, firms may find it most profitable to administer and coordinate their labor 
input through HRM practices that do not increase the KSAs or motivation of employees 
such as direct managerial supervision. Therefore, it appears that AMO cannot stand on its 
own as a theory that adequately evaluates the HRM decisions of all firms. 
Nonetheless, there is a valuable implication of AMO that can contribute to a more 
general theory of HRM.  When the human element of production substantially influences 
the output of the firm, firms will find advanced HRM policies and practices more 
profitable; however, if the technology of production (e.g., assembly lines or machinery) 
or the supply of raw materials drives the production process, then there is less incentive 
for firms to make significant HRM investments.6  Instead, firms will adopt other HRM 
strategies and systems, such as a “low involvement” or even sweatshop employment 
system (Lepak and Snell 2007).  As it pertains to explaining the frequency distribution, 
shown in Figure 2, the former group of firms is more likely to be located to the right of 
the center of the distribution, while firms in the latter group are generally located to the 
left of the center.  When the influence of AMO on a firm’s profit position is more 
moderate it will tend to locate itself in the center of the frequency distribution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In the PE literature this type of decision is characterized as a tradeoff between monitoring costs of worker 
effort and product quality – the firm can have low pay but carefully monitor easily measured outputs, or the 
firm can pay more and monitor less if the worker output quality cannot be readily measured and depends on 
workers effort and motivation. 
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A Systems Based Approach 
Historically, a large share of the HRM literature has focused on evaluating the 
adoption of individual HRM practices as an isolated choice rather than as part of an 
overall package or system (Hempel 1996).  However, it is not totally evident that using 
single practices as the standard unit of analysis for research is the best avenue for 
predicting this aspect of firm behavior.  Rather, it is becoming increasingly apparent that 
firm decisions focus on HRM systems in practice because firms can earn above normal 
profits by exploiting complementarities between HRM practices.  As a consequence, 
evaluating firms’ HRM decisions should focus on predicting the HRM systems that they 
choose instead of concentrating on individual practices (Huselid, Jackson, et al. 1997; 
Luthans and Sommer 2000).  
Empirical support for the presence of complementarities between individual 
practices in the HRM production function is found in (Black and Lynch 2001).  This 
study evaluates the decisions of over 3000 US firms in the late 80s and early 90s by 
specifying several HRM practices and a vector of control variables as right hand side 
covariates that predict variation in the dependent variable, labor productivity.  To see if 
synergies exist in the production function, Black and Lynch include interaction terms in 
their model that integrate the marginal effects of two HRM practices on productivity.  
Standing alone, none of the HRM variables are statistically significant in the estimated 
regressions.  However, the authors discover that certain synergies of HRM initiatives do 
have a positive and significant complementary impact on a firm’s productivity.  
Specifically, Black and Lynch comment that the most productive bundle of HRM 
practices would be to use benchmarking, TQM profit sharing for non-managerial workers 
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and have 50% of its workers meeting on a regular basis.  The combination of these 
actions in a nonunion firm implies a 4.5% increase in productivity compared to all other 
nonunion plants according to the data. 
Guthrie (2001) is a second study which shows that combining complementary 
HRM practices has a significant positive impact on firm performance.  In his analysis of 
firms from New Zealand, Guthrie shows the increased performance that comes from the 
interaction of two complementary HRM practices using an identical methodology to that 
of Black and Lynch.  Here, the labor productivity of the firm is predicted by variables 
that represent the firm’s participation in turnover and employment practices, an 
interaction term that equals one if the firm participates in both practices and zero 
otherwise, and a vector of control variables including size, age, unionization, primary 
industry and the firm’s tendency to pay wages that are higher than the market level (e.g., 
efficiency wages).  The estimated coefficient on the interaction term created by 
combining these HRM practices is found to have a statistically significant and positive 
influence on firm performance.  This indicates that there is an additional positive benefit 
that accrues to the firm’s labor productivity when the two practices are implemented 
simultaneously versus when they are used in isolation.  Thus, Guthrie empirically 
supports the claim that it is more beneficial from a productivity perspective for firms to 
implement systems of HRM practices versus unrelated individual practices. 
The results of these two studies highlight the existence of synergies that are 
created by implementing systems of complementary HRM systems versus using 
unrelated practices.  While the evidence that the most logical unit of analysis for 
evaluating firm decisions in the HRM system is clear, this concept is still under-theorized 
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(but see Begin 1991, Marsden 1999).  A substantial contributing factor to this trend in the 
analysis of firm choice is that it is hard to categorize the various HRM systems found in 
modern day U.S. organizations succinctly into a few discrete groups.  This issue is 
inherent to an evaluation of HRM systems because each firm chooses a system that 
addresses its own specific needs, imparting significant firm-by-firm heterogeneity.   
This problem, called the classification problem, has been a serious constraint on 
the development of a systems-based approach to studying HRM.  To make headway on 
the classification problem, some authors have inductively formulated a few classes of 
systems which they suggest are able to successfully categorize firms into discrete groups.  
One example is Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Work Systems, by Mintzberg 
(1983).  In his book, Mintzberg argues it is possible to classify the HRM systems found 
in all firms into five categories.  He states that “…a great many organizations…tend to 
design structures rather close to one of the [five] configurations.  No structure matches 
any one configuration perfectly, but some come remarkably close…” (1983, 288).  He 
explains that organizations select their system of HRM based on situational factors7 and 
the condition of the environment in which they operate.  The proposed HRM systems 
include:  1) the simple structure where workers are managed through the use of direct 
supervision; 2) a machine bureaucracy in which a standardized technological process 
controls worker output; 3) a professional bureaucracy where firms hire workers with 
accredited skills and then give them freedom to practice their trade with little supervision 
or direction; 4) the adhocracy system where firms are only focused on innovation; and 5) 
                                                 
7 Mintzberg states that the key factors describing organizational structure are job specialization, behavior 
formalization, training and indoctrination, unit grouping, unit size, type of planning and control system, 
liaison services, vertical decentralization of authority and horizontal decentralization of authority. 
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the divisionalized form used by large organizations where each division has its own 
specific needs and is delegated the power to manage its own HRM activities.    
These five theorized HRM systems can help explain the distribution of firm 
expenditures on HRM practices in the economy.  Two identifiable systems are proposed 
that use HRM practices with moderate intensity (machine bureaucracy and professional 
bureaucracy); two other systems are on the opposite sides of the spectrum–a high 
intensity system (adhocracy system) and a low intensity system (simple structure).  The 
fifth system has intensities ranging from low to high (divisionalized form).8  Thus, if 
firms randomly drawn from a population are distributed uniformly across these groups, 
then the aggregate bell-shaped frequency distribution may be partly explained by the 
individual HRM systems having firms placed toward the middle of their respective 
distributions (i.e., in bell-shape form within systems). 
Following the work of Mintzberg, Begin (1997) continues to develop the 
theoretical foundations which describe and predict the HRM systems used in 
organizations.  While there are several significant contributions found in his book, the 
key with respect to this dissertation is that he outlines the firm specific and environmental 
traits that are characteristic of the firms for each of the five proposed HRM systems.  
Later in this dissertation, a cluster analysis is performed to see if the observed use of 
different types of HRM practices in firms empirically validates the proposed HRM 
systems detailed above, with the exception of the divisionalized form.   
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, the variation in intensity within the divisionalized category means that it can not be easily 
distinguished using cluster analysis and, as a result, this dissertation focuses on the other proposed systems 
when conducting the cluster analysis.  In the end, this assumption should have little bearing on the final 
placement of firms into clusters since the divisionalized firms are most likely distributed somewhat equally 
across each of the HRM systems excluding the simple structure.  This is a result of the divisionalized 
system being nothing more than the addition of two other systems being implemented simultaneously in 
separate divisions of one firm. 
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To date, discussion of HRM systems in the management literature has remained 
largely theoretical and few quantitative studies have examined the issue.  One exception 
is by Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. (2000).  Here, the authors investigate the organizational 
practices of steel mills in the mid-1990s.  The authors find that the HRM practices used 
in these firms during this time period unambiguously fall into four distinct categories of 
HRM systems: traditional, incentive, participatory and high performance work systems 
(HPWS).   The traditional system is characterized by little or no participatory work, or 
incentive practices.  Next, incentive systems use employment security and 
quality/performance incentives to enhance the profitability of the firm.  Third, 
participatory systems offer workers increased voice and empowerment to increase 
motivation and effort in the workplace.  Finally, the organizations with HPWSs employ 
both participatory and incentive based practices in their systems.   
One interesting observation which can be made from these results is that if firms 
were randomly distributed in a uniform way across these four work systems, then the 
resulting frequency distribution of HRM practices in firms would be quite similar to the 
frequency distributions of interest shown in the previous chapter.  A minority of firms 
would have very few practices (traditional system), about half the firms would have 
moderate amount of practices (incentive and participatory systems), and the remaining 
25% of the firms would be out on the right hand tail (HPWS).  An additional important 
aspect of this study is that it provides the basis for the clustering methodology used in this 
dissertation.  A detailed description of this clustering methodology is discussed in 
Chapter V of this dissertation. 
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Labor Process 
 
A third theoretical perspective on the use of HRM in firms, the “labor process” 
theory (LP), comes from sociology, management control studies and radical economics.  
According to Marx’s perspective on firm operations, there are three elements which are 
common to the production function of all firms: output, capital and labor.  Output and 
capital are inert, but labor is ‘living labor’ in that it is embedded in human beings.  Thus, 
in the LP model a distinction is made between “labor” and “labor power” (this is not 
“bargaining power”).  Labor is the time of the worker the firm purchases for a wage, 
whereas labor power is the actual amount of effort (‘work’) done by the labor.  
Obviously, labor can be 40 hours per week, but labor power can be zero if the worker 
sleeps every day on the job or, for that matter, negative if there is sabotage or high error 
costs in the production process (say, a serious accident resulting from a sleeping worker).   
When there is some doubt as to the labor power that each employee will regularly 
contribute, it becomes difficult for firms to correctly predict the optimal, profit-
maximizing number of workers that they should employ.   Thus, when labor power is 
uncertain there is a higher probability that firms will be producing their output 
inefficiently because they employ too few or too many workers.  On the other hand, when 
firms are relatively sure of the level of productivity that their workers will realize on the 
job, it is easier to operate at the profit maximizing level.  As a consequence, firms will try 
to deskill, or mechanize the labor input in the production process to the degree that their 
technology of production will allow so that they can control and thereby predict labor 
productivity with more certainty (Braverman 1974).  In addition to deskilling, a second 
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method by which firms influence and/or control the actions of workers is through the use 
of HRM (Nordhaug 2004).  Hence, the pertinent aspect of the LP theory to this 
dissertation is that firms adopt HRM practices/strategies depending on the degree that 
such activities are needed to control and manage the labor power they obtain from their 
employees.  
One source of evidence in support of this prediction is found in (Bernie and 
Ramsay 1988).  In this study, the authors evaluate the changes to employee behavior that 
result from firms introducing new computer systems to improve communications in an 
office setting.  By controlling the channels through which employees can communicate 
and monitoring such communications, the results show that the new computer systems 
have the effect of deskilling the workforce, improving performance and shifting the locus 
of control in the employee-manager relationship towards management.   
Aguiar (2001) is a second study that finds that managers seek to mechanize the 
labor input to increase their control over the production process.  This study investigates 
the practices of firms in the commercial building cleaning industry in Toronto.  In the 
past, the employees in this industry were responsible for cleaning an entire area of an 
office building; however, at present, they only perform a particular task.  For example, 
rather than one person being responsible for an entire office, a team of employees work 
together to clean several offices where each person is assigned to a different aspect of 
cleaning including vacuuming, dusting and washing windows.  Over time, the workers 
become specialists in their field of cleaning and develop a high level of competency in a 
small number of skills.  Aguilar concludes that this shift in the work environment of 
commercial building cleaners has caused employees to lose discretion over how to 
 
37 
 
perform their tasks, but he also finds that the new method of cleaning has led to increased 
firm performance as offices are being cleaned at a faster rate than was true under the old 
system.  Thus, observations taken from the cleaning industry of Toronto show that firms 
do mechanize their labor input to improve productivity, just as is predicted by LP.   
As it relates to the firm’s expenditures on HRM practices, when the job roles of a 
firm are deskilled the production process requires a less sophisticated labor input than 
would be the case if no deskilling had occurred.  This implies that the firm’s need to 
augment the knowledge and skills of its workers with training will decrease with 
deskilling.  In addition, by causing the firm to require fewer skills in its labor input 
deskilling increases the supply of qualified labor in the external labor market.  That is, as 
the level of knowledge or skills required by the firm decreases the scarcity of qualified 
applicants will certainly not increase, ceteris paribus.  As a result, firms are less 
concerned with retaining employees and will invest less in HRM practices aimed at 
retention.  Thus, when a firm’s technological process leads to a highly deskilled labor 
force, the firm will have a relatively low level of expenditures on HRM practices geared 
towards training and retention, and choose to locate itself in the left hand side of the 
HRM frequency distribution.  On the other hand, it is also possible that firms will take an 
opposite approach to deskilling and choose to motivate their workers using a strategy that 
places a high degree of emphasis on “skill variety” (Noe, Hollenbeck, et al. 2005).  These 
firms will be located in the right-hand tail of the HRM frequency distribution.  Firms that 
take a more moderate approach to deskilling will find themselves located in the middle of 
the HRM frequency distribution. 
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The idea that firms use HRM practices as a method for controlling the labor input 
is also found in the management literature.  While not explicitly citing LP in his book, 
Mintzberg (1983) asserts a LP perspective by claiming that it is possible to classify the 
HRM systems of all firms according to the amount of monitoring and/or motivation that 
their employees require.  The descriptions earlier in this chapter of Mintzberg’s five 
proposed HRM systems clearly show that firm’s use of HRM to control their workers.  
For example, firms that use an employment system similar to the “simple structure” use 
very little HRM since they control and motivate workers through direct managerial 
interaction.  Thus, these firms tend to be located in the left hand portion of the HRM 
frequency distribution.  Next, firms that use an employment system resembling the 
“machine bureaucracy” will use a lot of HRM and be located towards the right-hand side 
of the HRM frequency distribution for several reasons including the need to appease the 
demands of unions, train employees how to use the firm’s specific equipment and 
establish extensive benefits plans.  Third, firms that use a “professional bureaucracy” 
employment system will tend to spend some resources on HRM practices like 
performance management to control the output of their employees; however, in general, 
these types of firms tend concentrate their HRM expenditures on recruitment practices.  
Then, when the firm finds qualified employees it gives them freedom to practice their 
trade with little supervision or direction.  Because these firms use relatively few HRM 
practices they are located in the left-hand portion of the HRM frequency distribution.  
Finally, firms that find it optimal to use the “adhocracy system” place a large emphasis 
on having a workforce that is happy, motivated and able to innovate.  To achieve these 
wanted outcomes for their workforces, these firms choose to allocate a large amount of 
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expenditures on HRM practices like recruitment, training, benefits administration and 
employee relations.  Hence, firms that use this system are located on the right-hand side 
of the frequency distribution.  Furthermore, the high degree of use of HRM in this 
employment system leads one to believe that the outliers in the right-hand tail of the 
frequency distribution can be explained by firms that find it advantageous to use 
“adhocracy” employment systems (Begin 1997). 
Assuming a profit maximization framework, LP suggests that firms have an 
incentive to employ HRM programs that will improve the predictability of labor 
productivity.  In this framework, the profitability of investing in HRM depends in part on 
whether or not the other inputs in the production function control the productivity of 
labor.  For example, in situations where labor productivity is constrained by a machine’s 
requirements or the availability of raw materials, investments into HRM are less able to 
positively impact the firm’s bottom line.  This is also the case in firms where the behavior 
of workers is difficult to modify using traditional HRM techniques because employees 
are intrinsically motivated.  These types of firms will be observed to have a very small 
demand for HRM and are found in the left-hand tail of the distributions shown above.  As 
the control that physical capital, raw materials and/or worker traits have over labor 
productivity wanes, the marginal benefit of using HRM to control the labor input will 
increase causing the firm to choose higher levels of demand for HRM.   
In the end, LP has very similar conclusions to the HRM literature when it comes 
to the probability that firms will engage in HRM.  The RBV, AMO and LP all imply that 
expenditures on HRM are increasing with the degree to which labor productivity and firm 
performance are correlated.  On the other hand, all three theories predict that there will be 
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relatively low expenditures on HRM by firms whose performance is not constrained by 
the productivity of its labor.  The benefit of the economic approach used in this 
dissertation is that it can largely accommodate and is not inconsistent with previous 
strands of literature, many of which provide helpful insights into the use of HRM 
practices in firms.  
 
 CHAPTER III 
MODELING THE FIRM’S DEMAND FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES  
 
The theoretical model used in this dissertation is based on the work of my 
dissertation advisor, Bruce Kaufman (2004; 2008).  His articles on HRM theory provide a 
new conceptual framework for understanding firms’ HRM choices.  Kaufman’s approach 
advances the HRM literature by providing an economics-based deductive theory of the 
use of HRM practices that is applicable to all firms in the economy.  In the last chapter, a 
review of the literature was given to provide a synopsis of existing models and theories of 
HRM choice as a point of reference. The purpose of this chapter is to outline this 
alternative economics-based theoretical approach as it applies to the firm’s demand for 
HRM practices.   Then the reader will understand how the same theory can be extended 
to evaluate the firm’s choice of entire employment systems.   
In developing his model, Kaufman (2004; 2008) includes HRM as an third input 
in the firm’s production function, in addition to the standard input variables, capital (K) 
and number of employees (L).  Thus, the output (Q) of goods and services by a firm is 
expressed using the following production function. 
 
Q = f(K, L, HRM)   (1) 
 
In this framework, HRM provides potential productivity enhancing benefits to the firm 
by increasing output.  HRM can be a complement or substitute for L and K.  Like L and 
K, HRM also entails costs.  These costs (formalized shortly) include the labor, capital and 
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intermediate goods required to produce the HRM practices and the amount of lost 
productivity that results from workers and managers taking part in HRM practices rather 
than spending their time producing output.  To depict this relationship between benefits 
and costs that a firm must consider when making HRM choices, Kaufman uses the 
standard economic theory of profit maximization.  By analyzing HRM choices in this 
way, we can derive the firm’s HRM demand curve and input demand function which 
predict its equilibrium level of HRM practices and choice of employment system.   
Theoretically speaking, the HRM demand curve and input demand function 
assume that firms choose different profit-maximizing levels of HRM practices due to 
heterogeneity in their firm-specific benefits and costs of HRM.  Thus, this economic 
model of the demand for HRM predicts dispersion in the use of HRM across firms and 
therefore provides a theoretical foundation for explaining the observed bell-shaped HRM 
frequency distribution.  An additional advantage of this model is that it can be extended 
to show that firms do not make choices about an individual HRM practice in isolation of 
other HRM practices, or in isolation from their choice of L and K (or, more generally, 
their choices of the types of labor and capital).  Rather, the model predicts that firms will 
demand HRM systems that benefit from complementarities between practices.  
Furthermore, they will use different bundles of HRM practices (i.e., employment 
systems) that reflect firm differences in the marginal revenue product of HRM practices 
per unit cost.   
In the end, this economic model of the demand for HRM practices provides a 
deductive theory that can address both of the research questions outlined in Chapter I of 
this dissertation.  To gain a better appreciation of the theory, the subsequent sections of 
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this chapter present a detailed derivation the HRM demand curve and input demand 
function, and extend the model to the firm’s choice of employment system.   
 
The Firm’s Demand for HRM Practices 
 
To properly develop the model that is used to derive the HRM demand curve and 
input demand function, the first step is to provide an in depth view of the way that HRM 
influences the productivity of the firm.  While the other factor inputs, L and K, directly 
influence production, HRM effects production through two channels: a direct effect and 
an indirect effect.  The direct effect of HRM includes activities that increase output 
independent of the use of K and L, such as investments in job evaluation (achieving a 
better person/job fit) or employee involvement (achieving greater coordination through 
information sharing).   
HRM practices also indirectly influence production by increasing the “effective” 
amount of labor or labor power, L(e), where e represents the level of effort provided by 
workers in a firm.  In this dissertation, effective labor is calculated by taking the product 
of the hours of labor input and the level of effort: L(e) = e*L.  According to this 
relationship, employees’ labor power can be zero if they don’t put forth any effort on the 
job.  This makes sense considering that an idle or sleeping worker produces no output.  
To improve the effort of workers, firms have the option of implementing HRM practices 
to motivate employees to be more productive members of the firm.  In fact, there are 
many ways that firms can use HRM to get a higher level of effort from workers, 
including policies that give employees monetary incentives to increase their productivity 
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(i.e., piece-rate compensation plans, commission programs), raise the level of morale by 
addressing procedural justice, outcome fairness and/or interactional justice (e.g., dispute 
resolution program or just-cause termination policy), and improve job satisfaction (e.g., 
job rotation, increased task identity and/or autonomy) (Noe, Hollenbeck, et al. 2007).  
Thus, we can model effort as a function of HRM; that is: e(HRM).9   
By introducing the HRM variable into the production function, this model is able 
to delineate the direct and indirect effects of HRM, and thereby contribute to the HRM 
literature by clarifying the previously obscure relationship between HRM and firm 
performance called the “black-box” problem.  To see this, we can take equation 1 and 
expand it, as given in equation 2. 
 
Q = f[K, e(HRM)*L, HRM]  (2) 
 
The variable HRM on the right part of the production function represents the direct 
effect; the term e(HRM)*L represents the indirect effect.   
In addition to introducing the HRM input variable in this fashion, there are two 
further modifications that can be made to the standard, simplistic economic model of 
production so that it is more representative of the processes that are used by firms in 
practice.  The first is to add a parameter to the model that reflects the way in which the 
factor inputs are combined to produce output (i.e., the organizational composition and 
managerial philosophy of the firm).  Here, this measure is represented using the standard 
designation for technology in the economics literature, A.    
                                                 
9 If we remove the ceteris paribus condition, then we must acknowledge that some profit maximizing HRM 
practices may decrease effort and lower morale but be offset by a lower wage   
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The final step taken in making this model more realistic is to acknowledge that 
firms do not use a simple labor input.  In fact, firms often rely on several types of labor 
that collectively work together to produce goods and services.  To incorporate this notion 
into the economic model of production specified above, we must enrich the L variable by 
transforming it into a composite measure that accounts for all the different types of 
employees that comprise the firms’ final labor input.  Mathematically this is done by 
changing L to a vector L such that L = ∑
i
 Li.  After adding these two modifications to the 
model, the augmented production function takes the following form shown in equation 3. 
 Q = f[A, K, ∑
i
 ei(HRM)* Li, HRM]  (3) 
In this model of production, the firm must choose the level of HRM that best 
achieves its organizational performance objective(s).  In order to model this choice, the 
theory used in this dissertation assumes that all firms have the objective of maximizing 
long-run profits (the present value of the firm).  Given this, the firm’s behavior can be 
evaluated using the standard profit maximization framework in economics which 
assumes that firms choose their inputs in a way that maximizes the difference between 
revenues and costs.  In this dissertation, the revenues of the firm are given by (the present 
value of) P*Q where P is the price of each unit of output produced by a competitive firm 
and Q is replaced by the production function shown in equation 3.  The other element of 
the profit equation, the cost function (C), is formed by multiplying K, L and HRM by 
their respective prices.  Specifically, this includes the cost of capital (r), wages (w) and 
the price of HRM (v), respectively.  In this model, v comprises the explicit costs of labor 
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and capital as well as any intermediate goods and services that are required to produce 
and deliver the HRM practices.   
To simplify this model it makes sense to assume that capital and labor (i.e., the 
number of employees) are fixed when making HRM choices.  In addition, by assuming 
that v is fixed by the market one can further simplify the model by attributing all the 
variation in the use of HRM in firms to the location of their demand curves (i.e., a 
parametric v makes the HRM supply curve to the firm perfectly elastic).  This assumption 
considerably simplifies the model, and does not materially affect the results; further, it 
broadly accords with reality since firms can usually obtain additional trainers, job 
evaluations, payroll processing, etc. at a more or less going market price.   
Analytically, the cost equation is shown by equation 4.  Combining revenues and 
costs we get the profit equation 5 that is used to derive the firm’s HRM input demand 
function.   
 
C = r*K + w* ℓ + v*HRM  (4) 
 
∏ = P*f[A, K, ∑
i
ei(HRM)* Li, HRM] - (r*K + w* L + v*HRM)  (5) 
 
Using equation 5, the demand for HRM is derived by differentiating the profit function 
with respect to HRM, setting the differential equal to zero, and solving the first order 
condition.  The result of this process is shown in equation 6: 
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The middle term of this expression shows that the marginal benefit of an incremental 
increase in the use of HRM practices is represented by its marginal revenue product (i.e., 
v = MRPHRM).  Here, we explicitly see both the direct and indirect channels through 
which changes in HRM influence firm performance.  The direct effect is shown at the 
change in Q that comes from an incremental change in HRM holding L constant, and the 
indirect effect relates the additional output that comes from increases in “effective” labor 
caused by an incremental change in HRM.  The indirect effect can be positive if the labor 
input and HRM are complements, or it can be negative if the inputs are substitutes (e.g., a 
labor-saving information technology HRM system).  
In equation 6, we can see that the classical marginal-decision rule found 
throughout economics also applies to the optimal use of HRM practices.  That is, the 
optimal choice of HRM practices occurs when the profitability of an additional unit of an 
HRM practice is equal to its price (i.e., the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost).  
According to the marginal-decision rule, if the marginal revenue product of an additional 
unit of HRM is greater than its price, v, then the firm should invest more resources into 
HRM because it improves profitability.  Additional HRM practices will continue to be 
integrated into the firm until their marginal benefits fall due to diminishing returns to the 
point where they equal the marginal costs.  On the other hand, a firm knows that it has 
over invested in HRM when the marginal benefit from an incremental increase in HRM 
 
48 
 
practices is less than the cost of the practice.  When a firm experiences this type of 
situation, it will reduce its utilization of HRM practices until the marginal revenue 
product of HRM and its price equilibrate. 
One significant contribution of this method of conceptualizing the firm’s decision 
to invest in HRM practices is that it can explain the shape of the HRM frequency 
distribution (see, for example, Figure 2).  Holding the price of HRM constant, equation 6 
indicates that firms that have relatively large potential benefits from using an additional 
unit of HRM will find that they can maximize profits by having a high level of HRM 
practices (e.g., as in an HPWS or an adhocracy employment system).  With respect to the 
HRM frequency distribution, these firms will be located on the right hand side of the 
curve.  But there are some firms that derive little or no benefit from using HRM practices 
and maximize profits with zero or close-to-zero HRM practices.  These types of firms 
will tend to use an ‘externalized’ or ‘market’ type employment system, as described by 
Delery and Doty (1996), where demand and supply set pay rates, motivate employees 
(through threat of unemployment), and provide new recruits and training opportunities.  
As a result, these firms find themselves on the left hand portion of the HRM frequency 
distribution.  The middle of the distribution, therefore, is comprised of firms that have 
more moderate potential benefits of using HRM (e.g., as in professional bureaucracy or 
machine bureaucracy employment systems).    
One implication of this model is that the HRM demand curve (i.e., the potential 
productivity and revenue benefits from using HRM) is the key to placing a firm on the 
HRM frequency distribution.  To make this method of conceptualizing firms’ HRM 
choices more transparent, equation 6 is used to derive the HRM demand curve shown in 
 
49 
 
Figure 4.  Here, the demand curve for HRM is derived by plotting the firm’s marginal 
revenue product for each level of HRM that the firm could potentially utilize (i.e., the 
bracketed part of equation 6). 
 
Figure 4: The Demand for HRM 
 
 
 
 
This graphical representation of this demand relationship is helpful in that it 
clarifies the relationship between firms’ potential benefits from using HRM practices and 
their position in the HRM frequency distribution.  The HRM demand curve shows the 
firm’s preferred quantity of HRM at particular price such as v1.  Assuming that HRM 
practices have non-negative costs and HRM exhibits diminishing marginal returns, a 
firm’s demand curve will be downward sloping as is shown in Figure 4.10  Using this 
                                                 
10 A caveat to this prediction is that firms may have an upward sloping demand curve when HRM is very 
close to zero.  However, Figure 4 omits this portion of the demand curve for the simplicity of exposition.  
Overall, this should be of little concern because the firm’s chosen level of HRM will never be in the portion 
of the HRM curve that is upward sloping.  This is because any upward sloping demand curve will become 
negative at some point due to diminishing marginal returns and terminate at the level of HRM where the 
marginal benefit is nil.  As a result, for every price where there is a point on the upward sloping potion of 
the demand curve there is also a point on the downward sloping potion of the curve.  Because more HRM is 
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schedule of demand for HRM, it is possible to predict any firm’s use of HRM just as was 
the case with equation 6.  
As a result of the fixed-price assumption, it is possible to predict the firm’s HRM 
decisions by focusing on their demand curves.  The position of the demand curve in the 
graph is dependent on the characteristics which influence the firm’s marginal benefits 
from HRM practices.  When the marginal benefits are high it indicates that the returns to 
a particular HRM investment are large.  This implies that one would expect for it to have 
a demand curve in the neighborhood of D2 of Figure 4. On the other hand, a firm with 
little to gain from instituting HRM practices would have a demand curve close to D3.   
The crucial implication of this diagram comes from observing the equilibrium 
level of HRM that is demanded by firms who have each of these demand curves.  Facing 
a constant price of HRM of v1, the optimal use of HRM varies according the location of 
the firms’ HRM demand curve.  Thus, the model of demand for HRM shown in this 
dissertation is able to explain the wide distribution of use of HRM by plotting the 
equilibrium level of HRM chosen by each firm.  That is, this model predicts that the 
majority of firms have intermediate demand curves (D1) and thus bunch together in the 
middle of the frequency distribution, while as we go toward either tail of the distribution 
there are successively fewer firms, such as those with curves D2  and D3. 
The location of the firm’s demand curve is predicted by a set of internal and 
environmental characteristics that determine the firm’s marginal benefits from using 
HRM.  These factors include the firms’ technology of production (determined in large 
part by the nature of the good or service it is producing), degree of unionization, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
better, ceteris paribus, this implies that the firm will always choose an equilibrium value on the downward 
sloping portion of its demand curve.  As such, there is no added benefit to graphing the upward sloping 
portion of the curve.  
 
51 
 
demographic and knowledge/skill characteristics of the workforce, and so on.  Changes in 
these factors that cause the firm’s marginal benefits to increase shift the demand curve to 
the right, while changes in these factors that reduce the marginal benefits from HRM shift 
the demand curve to the left.  In all, there are a relatively large set of shift variables 
suggested by the theoretical model, however there are also a few additional shift variables 
suggested by the literature which must be added to the model to make it more 
representative of the firm’s decision making process.  In the following section of this 
chapter all of these determinants of demand are outlined, including a short description 
their proposed relationships with the demand for HRM and whether or not they are 
derived from the theory.   
The next logical step in evaluating the firms’ demand for HRM practices is to 
transform the input demand function into a format that more closely resembles the HRM 
demand function.  To accomplish this, one need only invert the profit maximization 
equation in equation 6 to create an HRM demand function.  By doing this we can see that 
demand for the HRM input is a function of technology, the labor input, output prices and 
the prices of factor inputs as is shown in equation 7.   
 
L
HRM  = f (A, P, L, v, r, w)   (7) 
 
The next step in deriving the HRM demand function is to remove v to reflect the 
assumptions of a fixed price of HRM.  In addition, we assume that after controlling for 
size all firms have equal access to acquiring funds through assuming debt, and thus there 
is no variation in the interest rate (cost of capital) across firms.  As a result, this variable, 
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r, is dropped from the equation.  Finally, the equation is augmented by including the 
capital input variable and the aforementioned shift variables which are not part of the 
theoretical model.  In the end, we are left with equation 8 - the HRM demand function.   
 
      = f (A, P, L, K, w, Xi)    (8) L
HRM
 
At this point, it makes sense to identify some of the implications and strengths of 
the economics-based approach to predicting the firm’s use of HRM described above.  In 
total, the method of modeling the firm’s use of HRM is preferable to the incumbent 
theories in the literature for six main reasons.   
First, as was explained previously, this model is able to shed light on the “black-
box” problem in the HRM literature by clearly illustrating the link between HRM and 
firm performance.  This is accomplished in equation 6 which shows the derived indirect 
and direct effects of HRM on firm performance.   
Next, in the past, the there was no single theory which could explain the HRM 
choices of all firms.  For example, the conclusions of the resource-based view of the firm, 
labor process theory, and ability, motivation and opportunity (AMO) theory are 
applicable to firms who can use HRM to substantially improve their performance by 
increasing their labor productivity.  However, these theories do not apply to firms in 
which profits are driven by their technology of production or their access to raw materials 
or for which HRM has little productivity effect.  In this regard, Schneider, Hanges, et al. 
(2003) identify several ways in which the HRM→Performance model cannot be 
generalized.  They find that the theory doesn’t apply to small organizations, that the 
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outcomes of interest to which it can be applied are limited, and that factors associated 
with the organizational climate cannot be integrated into the model.  In contrast to this, 
Kaufman (2004) identifies the general nature of a model built on economic foundations 
as one of his theory’s main advantages.  Using his theoretical framework, the use of 
HRM in any firm is predictable using the HRM input demand curve and input demand 
function.   
Third, this model redefines what constitutes “best practice” HRM.  Numerous 
HRM studies have argued that more HRM leads to higher firm performance, implying 
“lots” of HRM is “best practice.”  For instance, Huselid and Becker (2006) argue that a 
one standard deviation increase in the use of HRM leads to a 10-20% increase in an 
average firm’s market value and a 4.6% increase in their return on assets (ROA).  This 
line of thinking implies that the long-run equilibrium HRM frequency distribution should 
be narrow and centered about a high level of HRM (i.e., as in an HPWS).  As a result, 
this theory suggests that the actually observed bell-shaped frequency distribution with 
skewness in the right-hand tail (as in Figure 2) must represent a huge state of 
disequilibrium (because many firms remain in the left hand tail of low HRM use).  
However, in practice it does not appear that Figure 2 is a state of disequilibrium; rather 
data from the period 1994-2005 shows that the HRM frequency distribution has not 
narrowed much over time, nor have firms gravitated towards a universal “best practice” 
HRM level such as an HPWS (Freeman and Rogers 1999; Joseph 2005; Joseph 2006; 
Bryson, Gomez, et al. 2007).   
Alternatively, the model presented here argues that Figure 2 shows a stable 
equilibrium of the use of HRM practices in firms.  Given v, the HRM demand curve 
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determines the firms’ choice of HRM and, once made, this selection of HRM leaves the 
firms with no incentive to change their use of HRM (i.e., the chosen level of HRM 
maximizes profits).  Alternatively stated, the economic model of the demand for HRM 
outlined in this chapter contradicts the incumbent HRM theories, arguing that the reason 
that firms have not chosen to adopt “best practice” HRM practices like a HPWS is 
because it does not pay–i.e., that it is not in fact “best practice” (as evaluated by the only 
long run metric that really counts: profit).   
The fourth reason that this model is a good analytical tool for evaluating the HRM 
decisions of firms is that it reveals shortcomings in the existing theoretical and empirical 
models.  For example, the common assumption in the management literature is that the 
HRM practice variables are independent (exogenous) variables that determine firm 
performance (profits).  But the economics-based model shows that this specification is in 
serious error since the HRM practices are themselves endogenous choice variables 
determined in the profit maximizing calculus (see equation 6).11  By specifying the HRM 
variable as the dependent variable of the estimating equation and not as an independent 
variable, the HRM input demand function is able to avoid this issue.  Just to provide an 
obvious example, the dramatic decline in the price of IT and disseminating company 
information on computer networks (represented here by a decline in price v of 
implementing types of HRM systems), has led to numerous changes in the practices of 
human resource departments.   
A fifth advantage of this approach to explaining the firm’s use of HRM is that it is 
based on a theory that uses deductive rather than inductive reasoning.  This theory is 
deductive in that it uses a few general assumptions about firm behavior to derive the 
                                                 
11 See Gerhart (2007) for a full review of the issues with estimating the HRM-Performance relationship. 
 
55 
 
HRM demand curve and input demand function.  In the past, inductive theories have been 
developed in the HRM literature that observe a firm’s HRM practices and performance, 
and then make conclusions using these observations.  In general, these studies focus on 
what firms should do, rather than identifying and explaining what they are most likely to 
do in practice (Pfeffer 1994; Becker and Huselid 1999; Farndale and Paauwe 2007).  
A final benefit of modeling firm behavior using the HRM input demand function 
is that there are several ways in which this framework for understanding firm’s HRM 
choices can be applied in practice.  The model can be used to examine the firm’s choice 
of expenditures on HRM as is done in this dissertation.  In addition, this model can be 
used to evaluate factors that influence the firm’s demand for a particular HRM system if 
the bundle of HRM practices which comprise the system are known.  Thus, one purpose 
of the cluster analysis performed in Chapter V of this dissertation is to identify a few 
HRM systems that classify all firms so that the use of each of these systems can be 
evaluated using this model of demand.   
 
The Equilibrium Mix of HRM Practices  
 
 In the previous section of this chapter an economics-based model is developed 
that explains the shape of the HRM frequency distribution.  This approach argues that 
there are specific internal and environmental characteristics that cause heterogeneity in 
the equilibrium level of HRM across firms.  In this section, the model is extended to 
provide a theoretical basis for predicting the optimal mix of HRM practices chosen by 
firms (i.e., their choice of employment system).  Analytically, this extension requires that 
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we treat the HRM variable as a vector representing broad functional areas of HRM 
practices (rather than as a single aggregated input).  For instance, the HRM variable in 
equations 5 and 7 should be replaced by HRMi (i = 1, …, n) where HRM1 = recruitment, 
HRM2 = selection, HRM3 = training, and so on.  The second step in extending this model 
is to disaggregate the per unit cost of HRM (i.e., vi (i = 1, …, n) so that v1 = per unit cost 
of recruitment practices, v2 = per unit cost of selection practices, HRM3 = per unit cost of 
selection practices training, etc…   
By making these changes, we transform the first order condition that results from 
optimizing the profit equation from a single equation to n equations as is shown by 
comparing equation 6 to the following system of equations 9.   
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Assuming that all HRM practices have positive costs, the firm will maximize profits at 
the point where the ratio of the marginal revenue product of any two HRM inputs are 
equal to the ratio of their prices (Jehle and Reny 2001).  Intuitively, this approach makes 
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sense in that it mimics the way that consumers maximize utility by equating the marginal 
utility per dollar spent on each item purchased (Kaufman 2008). Mathematically, this 
relationship is shown in equation 10. 
 
            MRPrec./vrec. = MRPselection/vselection   = MRPi/vi,  ∀  i = 1,…,n  (10)   
 
Equation 10 states in words that firms adjust their levels of each HRM practice until there 
is equality among all practices in the revenue gained per dollar of expenditure.   
This extension of the economics-based approach to understanding HRM choices 
is useful in that it theorizes that the investments in each of the firms’ individual HRM 
practices are interrelated.  The individual HRM practices used by firms can interact with 
one another in three possible ways: they can be complements, substitutes or unrelated.  
Mathematically this is shown by taking the second derivative of the profit function shown 
in equation 11 with respect to two HRM practices (i.e., δΠ2/ δHRMi δHRMj).12   
 
∏ = ∑
ij
P*f[A, K, ej(HRMi)* Lj, HRMi] - (r*K + w* Lj + v*HRMi)  (11) 
If the second derivate is positive then the two HRM practices are complementary, 
meaning that an increase in the use of one HRM practice increases the marginal benefit 
and use of the other, and vice versa.  If it is negative, the use of one of the HRM practices 
causes the demand for a second HRM practice to decrease, indicating that they are 
substitutes.  Third, if the second derivative of the profit function with respect to two 
individual HRM practices is equal to zero then the two practices are separable and 
                                                 
12 The difference between equation 4 and 10 is that the HRM variable is now indexed (i.e., HRMi).   
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additive (since even our measures of “individual” HRM practices are aggregated, zero 
interaction between two HRM practices could likewise imply that substitution and 
complementarity effects cancel out).   
One implication of this model that differentiates it from past theories in the HRM 
literature is that it predicts that firms will consider their entire system of HRM practices 
when making HRM choices rather than focusing on a single HRM practice.  To the extent 
that HRM practices are complementary, then we should observe firms’ choosing those 
bundles of HRM practices that are profit maximizing. 
 
HRM Demand Shift Factors 
 
In the first two sections we used the standard economic model of profit 
maximization to develop the HRM demand curve as an analytical tool for predicting the 
firm’s location in the HRM frequency distribution and subsequently utilize the model to 
predict how firms will bundle practices into HRM systems.  Using this framework, 
differences in HRM demand curves among firms explain the observed variation in their 
use of HRM practices (i.e., the bell-shape of the HRM frequency distribution).  Thus, the 
key question that follows is: What factors cause firms to have different demand curves?  
To answer this question, this section identifies a set of “shift variables” comprised of 
internal and environmental factors that differentiate the benefits per unit cost that a firm 
receives from using HRM.  Many of these variables are included in the present economic 
model; however, there are also a few additional variables that are believed to influence 
the firms’ demand for HRM, and so they are included as control variables in the model 
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specification.  With respect to the HRM demand function shown in equation 8, the first 
two shift factors explained below pertain to technology, A, as they all reflect the way in 
which the factor inputs are coordinated to produce a good or service.  Next, the third and 
fourth shift factors pertain to the capital input, K, and prices, P, respectively.  Factors five 
to eight all reflect the size and composition of the labor force and therefore pertain to L.  
The ninth factor corresponds to wages, w, and the rest of the independent variables are 
those which are subsumed in the X vector as control variables.  The hypothesized 
relationship each of these independent variables with the use of HRM for is found under 
each subheading.   
Organizational Characteristics.  Three organizational characteristics that 
influence a firm’s use of HRM are the degree of centralization of operations, whether it is 
a government entity, and its profit/non-profit status.  First, highly centralized companies, 
particularly those with many branches or divisions, tend to require more formal HRM 
practices since they have to consistently apply corporate policy to many groups of 
workers (Kaufman 2008).  Next, organizations that are non-profits are expected to have a 
low demand for HRM compared to for-profit private businesses.  As compared to other 
organizations, people that are attracted to non-profits tend to be intrinsically motivated by 
factors such as a belief in the organization’s mission, opportunity to realize individual 
values and participation in decision-making.  Thus, the mix of HRM may differ between 
for-profit and non-for-profit companies.  For example, as a result of this intrinsic 
motivation, firms can use relatively less HRM to recruit, retain and motivate their 
employees (Brown and Yoshioka 2003).  However, they will most likely utilize more 
employee relations activities since they provide more employee voice and participation 
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which “mission” employees tend to want.  With respect to governmental organizations, 
the use of HRM is thought to be relatively high since it is not subject to a profit constraint 
and due to its public nature has greater need to promote fairness, standardize practices 
and so on.   
Management Philosophy.  In general, the profit maximization framework used in 
this dissertation assumes that firms make HRM decisions with the strategic objective of 
maximizing profit.  While this business strategy does apply to many firms’ choice 
processes, there are also cases where the firms’ decisions are driven by managers’ beliefs 
and ideals (Begin 1997).  These “ideology-based” firms gain utility from pursuing their 
mission in addition to profits.  As a result, it is possible that they will choose a demand 
for HRM that differs from that chosen by firms whose only strategic goal is profit 
maximization, ceteris paribus.  Thus, this factor is very similar to the “taste/preference” 
factor in the traditional microeconomic theory of demand in that it explains the non profit 
maximizing behavior of firms.  As it relates to the HRM demand function, if there are 
firms that have an ideology that caters to investments that motivate, control and/or 
improve the abilities of its employees, then it will probably make the firm more likely to 
invest in HRM practices since HRM practices address these wanted outcomes.  Thus, a 
management philosophy favoring an HPWS will, for example, unequivocally lead to 
higher demand for HRM.   
Aside from the individual beliefs of the firm’s founders or managers, a second 
potential source of a firm’s “ideology” comes from the culture and social norms in which 
it operates.  Culture and norms often vary by geographic location (e.g., nation, region).  
These influence managerial assessment of the fairness of a situation or the value of a 
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worker which, in turn, impacts HRM choices (Brewster 2004).  For example, the 
emphasis on loyalty and long-term relationships of Japanese firms leads to high levels of 
HRM practices as compared to workers and managers in the USA who have a more 
short-term orientation (Hofstede 1993). 
Production Technology.  The relationship between the firm’s type of production 
process and the demand for HRM can be positive or negative.  On one hand, firms that 
use more technologically advanced systems of production typically require a higher level 
of HRM practices since the employees in these firms have higher complementary skills 
or greater influence on the productivity of the technology (Begin 1997).  On the other 
hand, there are also situations where a highly sophisticated technology of production 
(e.g., automated) leads to minimal use of HRM.  The reason for this is that the job 
processes/formalization in these types of firms tends to be dictated by the machines, 
which thus downgrades the importance of employee skills and discretion (Lepak and 
Snell 2007).   
One special category of production technologies worth discussing are industries 
that are service-oriented.  In general, it is very hard to make generalizations regarding the 
relationship between service industry firms and the demand for expenditures on HRM 
industries.  The principle reason for this uncertainty is that there exists a large amount of 
heterogeneity in the technology of production in this class of firms.  The BNA dataset 
highlights this point as it includes a variety of service organizations ranging from fast 
food restaurant companies to law firms 
There are two factors that enter into the firms’ choice of HRM that should be 
mentioned.  In the end, both of these characteristics of service firms indicate that they 
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will have a higher level of expenditures on HRM practices as compared to manufacturing 
firms.  First, employees in service organizations tend to have more personal contact with 
customers than is true in manufacturing firms.  Because of the relative importance of 
customer contact in service industries, they have more incentive to use HRM to control 
the effort and motivation of their workforce.  Also, services are normally consumed as 
they are produced (whereas much of manufacturing involves durable goods), which 
makes it imperative that the products have a consistent level of quality since there is no 
time to use quality control to inspect and scrap defective output.  As a result, to maintain 
a quality product, firms in the service industry will invest heavily in training as well as 
practices which keep worker motivation and effort at a high level.  This includes 
instituting programs such as incentive pay plans and a broader choice of benefits to 
ensure that their product maintains a high quality (Othman 1998).  
A second study which finds that non-manufacturing firms will have a higher 
incidence of HRM practices is Black and Lynch (1998).  In this article, the authors use 
survey data from 1994 to try to uncover how the incidence and content of formal training 
programs are connected to workplace characteristics and practices.  One of the many firm 
characteristics that they focus on is the sector in which the firm operates.  While they do 
not provide conclusive reasons as to why non-manufacturing firms utilize higher levels of 
HRM, the data do suggest that the use of HRM in non-manufacturing firms is larger than 
in manufacturing firms. 
Product Market Characteristics.  The market concentration of the industry in 
which the firm operates, a (imperfect) proxy for the degree of product market 
competition, is expected to be positively related to the demand for HRM practices (i.e., 
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more concentration implies more HRM).  Relative to firms operating in low 
concentration (competitive) sectors, firms in concentrated sectors may have more 
discretionary income to put towards investment in HRM practices since they tend to earn 
higher extraordinary monopoly profits.  That is, highly profitable firms may rent-share 
not only wages but HRM practices. 
A second aspect of the product market that influences the use of HRM is the 
variability of the product market.  In theory the relationship between product market 
variability and the demand for HRM can be positive or negative, and thus remains an 
empirical question.  First, when a product market is seasonal or experiences marked 
cycles, it is reasonable to expect a high level of employee turnover (Hempel 1996).  In 
general, the relationship between employee turnover and HRM has been empirically 
shown to be negative (Messersmith 2008).  For instance, when there is large variation in 
the level of employment in a firm, it will not aggressively train employees because the 
transitory nature of the employment relationship makes it difficult to recoup such 
investments (Bayo-Moriones and Huerta-Arribas 2002).  In addition, a high level of 
turnover gives firms less incentive to implement HRM practices that take time to create 
added motivation and productivity, such as programs directed at providing employee 
voice.  This is in contrast to compensation programs which immediately influence 
employee behavior.  
It is also possible that this relationship could be positive.  In theory, one might 
suspect that firms with high turnover rates demand more extensive selection and 
termination practices to deal with their frequent hiring and firing of employees.  On top 
of having formal procedures for dissolving the employment relationship such as 
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severance pay and assisting laid-off employees in looking for a new job, firms will need 
to spend extra resources on media and other external relations to maintain a satisfactory 
public image.  In addition, Wright and Snell (1998) claim that firms with a lot of 
variation in employment will have a high demand for entrenched HRM systems which 
give workers a mentality that is open to accommodating organizational changes such as 
job rotation programs.   
Employment.  As the size (e.g., the number of employees) of an organization 
increases, so does its demand for HRM practices due to added difficulties and 
complexities in organizing workers using the external labor market (Huselid 1995; Begin 
1997; Datta, Guthrie, et al. 2005; Katou and Budhwar 2006).  While this proposed 
relationship is quite rational, there is also reason to believe that the price of HRM 
changes due to economies of scale.  For example, Boxall and Purcell (2007) argue that 
firms that are large in size have lower costs of HRM innovations per worker due to 
economies of scale.  Also, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) find that EU firms tend to 
place a large focus on gaining economies of scale through outsourcing when HRM 
services to their employees. 
One implication of the existence of economies of scale in the production of HRM 
services is that larger firms will provide more services than smaller firms given a constant 
level of expenditure per employee on HRM services.  Alternatively stated, larger firms 
can achieve a given level of use of HRM at a lower cost as compared to smaller firms.  
To illustrate this point, we can consider the way that information technology influences 
administrative practices.  The use of information technology has made it so that many 
administrative practices require large fixed costs consisting of computers, networking and 
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(customized) software; however, once these systems are instituted, the variable costs of 
administering an additional worker with the system is marginal.  As a result, small and 
medium size firms are more likely to outsource HRM practices because their size does 
not allow them to benefit from the substantial economies of scale that are captured by 
large firms in providing administrative HRM practices (Klaas 2003).   
A second example where larger firms have a relatively low cost of providing 
HRM practices is seen when looking at the provision of healthcare benefits.  In general, 
firms are able to provide healthcare services to workers at a relatively lower price 
because the insurance policy can pool the risk of all the employees together.  By doing 
this, the average risk associated with each individual employee becomes lower than 
would be the case if no pooling occurs (i.e., the workers each purchase private insurance 
policies).  Thus, as the size of a firm grows it is able to provide health benefits to its 
workforce at a lower cost.   
As a result of the potential for changes in the price of HRM, the link between the 
size of the firms’ workforce and their expenditures on HRM practices per employee 
remains uncertain.  Even though there is no doubt that larger firms use more HRM, we 
cannot be sure whether or not this added need for services will be counteracted by 
economies of scale that reduce their costs.  Rather, this remains an empirical question that 
will be answered in the next chapter, Chapter IV.  
Knowledge and Skills Characteristics.  The degree to which workers rely on 
“general” skills that are valued at more than a single firm (i.e., transferable) as compared 
to “firm-specific” skills that are learned only with the current employer (i.e., non-
transferable) influences the demand for HRM.  As the firm-specific skills required for 
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production increase so will the firm’s demand for HRM practices.  This is due to these 
firms’ relative need for an internal labor market that uses training programs to supply 
new employees with the needed firm-specific skills as well as practices that motivate the 
employee to use the skills correctly on the job.  In addition, when there is a high level of 
firm-specific training provided to employees, firms have incentive to promote voice and 
fairness to help retain the skills so that firms can profit from their initial investment in 
training.  Finally, it is also worth noting that companies will fund general training if 
workers already posses some specific training.  One explanation for this is that there may 
be complementarities in production between the incumbent firm-specific skills of the 
workforce and general skills.  Because of the added profits that come from these 
complementarities, firms are more likely to pay for general skills training (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999). 
To try to maximize the return on their investment in providing training to 
employees, firms select employees that have a high probability of successfully 
completing the training program.  One way in which this is accomplished is by screening 
out all applicants whose educational achievements demonstrate that they have not been 
able to, or lacked the commitment to, learn and apply similar types of concepts and/or 
skills in the past.  Thus, there is reason to believe that the level of educational 
achievement and the demand for HRM will be positively related.  One the other hand, 
there is also a strong argument that education and the demand for HRM will be 
negatively correlated because firms pay lesser educated workers relatively low wages and 
use general training on the job to substitute for training in school.  Therefore, in the end, 
it is possible that the relationship between education and the demand for HRM could be 
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positive or negative.  Thus, the true relationship remains an empirical question which we 
are able to investigate in the empirical estimations shown in Chapter IV. 
Occupational Characteristics.  It is hard to generalize the manner in which a firm 
that employs a largely white collar workforce will utilize HRM practices versus one that 
employs labor force with a high proportion of blue collar workers.  The reason for this is 
that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the types of occupations that are categorized 
as being white collar positions (e.g., file clerks, professors and attorneys).  As a result of 
the variation of other shift variables such as the employees’ average wages and their level 
educational achievement and skills within the white collar designation, it is impossible to 
make predictions when looking at this variable.  Thus, no clear hypothesis can be made 
that relates the precise impact of the proportion of white collar workers in a firm on the 
utilization of HRM practices.   
 Workforce Demographics.  The relationship between the demand for HRM and 
the presence of women and minorities in the workplace is uncertain.  On one hand, there 
is reason to suspect that firms will provide less HRM practices on average to these groups 
of workers since they also pay these groups of workers lower wages.  Market wages are 
lower for women and minorities for a host of reasons we do not full understand including 
discrimination.  To the extent that wages and HRM expenditures per employee are used 
together to motivate and control employees, it is reasonable to expect a low level of HRM 
in firms that have a high proportion of women or minorities.  On the other hand, by 
implementing HRM policies that address potential issues in the workplace, managers can 
address problems before they cause workers to quit or file official legal claims against the 
firm.  This is especially important for issues that are racially or gender motivated since 
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the Equal Opportunity and Employment Commission find that they are two leading 
sources of discrimination claims in US firms (Noe, Hollenbeck, et al. 2005).  
Wage Rate. Theoretically, the fifth independent variable in equation 8, the wage 
rate, can be a substitute or a complement for HRM practices (Ichniowski, Shaw, et al. 
(1997).  When the wage rate is a substitute for HRM practices, firms may use a higher W 
in lieu of formal HRM practices. An example would be efficiency wage theory where 
being paid a higher-than-market wage motivates employees to self-enforce higher work 
effort which enables firms to reduce direct HRM control devices such as supervision and 
time clocks.  On the other hand, firms that use high performance work systems often pay 
employees a higher than market wage to complement other HRM practices which are 
also aimed at increasing performance and/or retention like providing workers with 
flexible work arrangements (e.g., telecommuting or job sharing).    
Labor Market Characteristics (Unemployment). When firms can count on a 
readily available supply of qualified labor in the external market there are fewer benefits 
to implementing an internal labor market (Osterman 1987; Marsden 1999).  However, 
when firms cannot rely on the external labor market to provide a qualified labor input 
they produce their labor input in their own internal labor market.  The development of a 
qualified labor force through an internalized labor market often requires a firm to utilize a 
broad spectrum of HRM practices.  Thus, as the supply of qualified labor in the external 
labor market increases, the demand for establishing an internal labor market decreases as 
does the demand for HRM (Doeringer 1967).   
Unionization.  The relationship between unionization and the demand for HRM 
practices is uncertain.  Union recognition might increase demand for HRM practices 
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since unions endeavor to negotiate more formalized, structured and standardized 
employment management practices (Turner 1994).  And of course negotiating contracts, 
along with the occasional use of mediation and arbitration, involve substantial HRM 
expenditures (in particular, legal expenditures), although these expenditures may not be 
captured in the data used in this analysis.  However, the presence of unions could also 
decrease the firm’s use of HRM if the union assumes certain HRM functions like 
selection (e.g., a hiring hall, admittedly a rarity outside construction since passage of 
Taft-Hartley in 1947), resolving disputes, or resists certain incentive compensation 
practices that might increase HRM expenditures. 
Firm Age.  Past studies have shown that the choice and implementation of HRM 
practices is thought to be more effective in older firms.  This is largely because the 
managers, and to a certain degree the employees, in these organizations are more 
experienced, having possibly dealt with similar situations in the past (Huselid, Jackson, et 
al. 1997).  In addition, older firms will discovery new ways of implementing HRM 
practices over time that improve the efficiency with which such practices are provided.  
These innovating changes in HRM improve efficiency by increasing productivity or 
reducing price, both of which lead to an increase in the demand for HRM, ceteris 
paribus.  On the other hand, older firms have more fomalized practices and procedures 
then younger firms, ceteris paribus, and so they have greater incentive to resist changes 
in their organization’s HRM policies and procedures (Begin 1997).  As a result, it might 
make more sense for older firms to retain their historical HRM systems while it may be 
optimal for newer organizations to adopt a different set of HRM practices.  
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Government Regulation.  Firms that operate in industries that have a high degree 
of government regulation will have a relatively high demand for HRM practices.  This is 
because these firms use HRM to reduce their potential legal liability by being in fuller 
compliance with government employment mandate(s).  The benefits of using HRM 
practices relations in this way include reducing legal costs and keeping the firm’s name 
from being publicized negatively as a violator of labor or environmental standards.  Some 
examples of HRM practices that would fit into this category are affirmative action 
programs, union/labor relations (e.g., allowing union representation at board of directors 
meetings) and safety inspections. 
Strategic Role of HRM in the Firm.  As the role that the HR director is able to 
take in coordinating corporate strategy increases so will the overall expenditures on HRM 
per worker.  This prediction is derived from the theory of bureaucracy which predicts that 
individuals are most interested in maximizing their own budgets (Brennan and Buchanan 
1980).  Thus, the predicted relationship between demand for HRM and the strategic role 
of the HR department in overall firm decisions is likely to be positive.  Stated differently, 
firms that choose high levels of HRM expenditure are likely to assign HRM departments 
a larger role in decision making. 
 Level of the Surveyed HR Department in the Organization.  Within the dataset 
used in this dissertation there are survey respondents from HR departments located in 
central corporate offices as well as divisional and subsidiary offices.  Because of this 
variation, it is important to control for the level of the HRM department of the survey 
respondent since there are some HRM practices that a division or branch of a firm does 
not demand precisely because they are already provided centrally.  This includes 
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practices such as compensation administration, benefits administration and publishing 
policy handbooks and other materials, whose ability to be produced with large economies 
of scale at the central level make them unlikely to be found in a divisional or subsidiary 
office.  Thus, it is expected that an HRM department that is only responsible for a branch 
or division of a firm would have a lower demand for HRM than would be the case if it 
were located in the central corporate office of the same organization.   
 
The Economic Model of the Demand for HRM and the Research Questions 
 
 The attractiveness of the economics-based model of the demand for HRM is that 
it can provide answers to the two research questions stated in the first chapter of this 
dissertation.  In the first section of this chapter the HRM demand curve and input demand 
function are developed.  After augmenting these analytical tools with the shift factors 
described in the second section of this chapter, we can answer the first stated research 
question by predicting the firms’ demand curves.  Using these curves, we can graphically 
determine the equilibrium level of demand for HRM for each firm, which predicts their 
position on the HRM frequency distribution.  One significant implication of this theory of 
demand for HRM is that the shape of the HRM frequency distribution is an equilibrium 
result.  The reason that the distribution takes on the bell-shape with skewness in the right-
hand tail is because the optimal levels of HRM vary from firm to firm according to 
internal and environmental characteristics that determine the marginal benefit and cost of 
an additional unit of HRM. 
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 The next stated line of inquiry in this dissertation looks to see if firms’ choose 
systems of HRM practices, and if so, what factor(s) determine this choice.  Accordingly, 
the third part of this chapter shows us that the demands for individual HRM practices are 
interrelated by replacing the aggregate HRM input with a vector of individual HRM 
practices.  By extending the model in this way, we find that HRM practices can be 
complements, substitutes or be unrelated.  In general, firms have incentive to create 
complementarities between individual practices so that they can benefit from added 
productivity or reduced costs when providing HRM.  Thus, there is reason to believe that 
firms do demand HRM systems, implying that past research which has focused on 
isolated HRM practices may be mis-specified (Huselid, Jackson, et al. 1997; Luthans and 
Sommer 2000).  Furthermore, this model theorizes that the key element in the firms’ 
choice of employment system is their marginal revenue product per unit cost of different 
HRM practices.  As the marginal revenue product of HRM practices per unit cost 
between firms varies, so will the adoption of different employment systems.  Thus, one 
implication of this model is that firms should not all be expected to use a HPWS (i.e., 
AMO theory) because of heterogeneity in the marginal revenue product per unit cost for 
the various HRM practices.  In practice, however, it makes sense to expect to observe a 
few groups of firms that share similar marginal revenue products of HRM practices per 
unit cost as has been hypothesized in the HRM literatures (Mintzberg 1983; Begin 1997; 
Marsden 1999).  To see if firms use different (unique) employment systems or if there are 
few common groupings of HRM practices among similar firms, a cluster analysis is 
performed in Chapter V.  If firms cluster into a few discrete groups that share similar 
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marginal revenue products of HRM practices per unit cost, then they should likewise 
cluster into distinct employment systems using common sets of HRM practices. 
 CHAPTER IV 
ESTIMATING THE FIRM’S DEMAND FOR EXPENDITURES ON HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
The HRM demand curve and input demand function provide a theoretical 
foundation for explaining the HRM choices of firms; however, to date, there has been no 
empirical test of this theory.  The purpose of this chapter is to take the first step in this 
direction and estimate an empirical approximation of the theoretical HRM demand 
function.  To accomplish this, it is necessary to modify the theory derived in Chapter III 
so that it can be estimated using available data.  To get a better understanding for the 
modifications that are made, this chapter begins with a description of the dataset used to 
specify the estimating equation.  After this, the chapter continues by presenting the 
dependent and independent variables that are used to specify the model as well as the 
econometric methodologies that are used in estimation.  The chapter concludes by 
presenting the results of the model as well as a test of its robustness to an alternative 
specification. 
 
Dataset 
 
The majority of the information used to empirically analyze the demand for HRM 
comes from survey data collected by the Bureau of National Affairs for its 2005 and 2006 
HR Department Benchmarks and Analysis reports.  The quality and depth of information 
on firms’ HRM activities in the BNA dataset are superior to that found in other sources.  
In all, the BNA dataset contains 614 observations on firms’ expenditures on HRM 
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practices for the 2005 fiscal year.  These data are useful for this dissertation because they 
come from a comprehensive survey of HR departments from a diverse group of firms.  In 
addition to providing information on the outcome variables, the BNA survey data also 
include information on many of the independent variables used in the estimating 
equation.  A further resource contained in the BNA dataset is the firm’s principal 3-digit 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code.  Using this code, the 
remaining independent variables are specified with industry-level information from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission.  
After removing firms that don’t have information on their NAICS code from the dataset 
we are left with 381 observations.13  A copy of the survey used by the BNA is found in 
the Appendix.   
Before explaining the specific dependent and independent variables used to 
specify the model, there are a few aspects of the collection of the data set that should be 
pointed out.  First, because the BNA has the responsibility of protecting the privacy of 
survey respondents, the names and/or addresses of the firms are unavailable.  This is not 
of great detriment to the present study because there is a large amount of firm specific 
information included in the survey.   
A second independent aspect of the data is that the survey respondents are 
executives and managers of organizations with an HR department and a minimum 
headcount of at least 25 employees.  There are both advantages and disadvantages to 
using HR executives and managers as survey respondents.  On the one hand, managers 
have the best ability to appraise the use of HRM in their firm because they know about all 
                                                 
13 In 29% of the firms a 2-digit NAICS code is used because it is all that was available. 
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the services that they are providing, whereas individual employees may only know about 
the HRM practices that affect them.  However, relying on the information of top 
executives can also produce reporting error (as in most surveys) since their responses 
may indicate “intended” HRM practices, which are not always in line with what HRM 
practices are actually implemented (Khilji and Wang 2006). 
Next, in some cases the survey respondents are HR professionals from 
organizations with single HR departments, while in others there are multiple HR 
departments (e.g., an HR department for each division or facility as well as the corporate 
headquarters).  To control for this difference respondents were instructed to indicate their 
level within the organization and only provide data pertaining to the activities performed 
and the employees served by their own HR department.  A variable controlling for the 
location of the HR department is included in the estimating equations.   
Finally, because the survey is time consuming not all survey participants 
completed the section of the survey covering the specific HR department activities (see 
Sections E and G in the BNA survey shown in the Appendix).  As a result, the dataset 
used to perform the cluster analysis in the following chapter is based on a subset of the 
data used in the empirical test reported in this chapter.  In addition, the number of 
respondents who completed the budget section of the survey was less than the total 
surveyed because not all HR departments have separate budgets. 
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Specifying the Estimating Equation 
 
Dependent Variable 
In order to empirically test the HRM demand function derived in Chapter III, 
reproduced in equation 8 below, a linear equation is estimated where the dependent 
variable for HRM is specified as the log of the firm’s aggregate expenditures on HRM 
per employee.   
 
          = f (A, P, L, K, w, Xi)    (8) 
L
HRM
 
This way of measuring the firm’s utilization of HRM is unlike past studies which have 
calculated HRM using an index that reflects the reported number of individual practices 
in a firm (e.g., Freeman and Rogers 1999, Bryson et al. 2007).  Certainly the number of 
individual HRM practices and the level of HRM expenditures per employee are useful 
measures of HRM utilization in an organization; however, the latter measure is arguably 
preferable.  By lumping all HRM practices into a single composite score with each 
practice taking the same value, it is possible to overstate the presence of HRM in some 
firms while not recognizing the amount used in others.   
Several examples in the BNA dataset illustrate this situation.  For example, two 
firms might both indicate that they participate in ‘skills training’; however, one firm 
could require employees to engage in five hours of training a month while the other firm 
only requires five hours a year.  Likewise, a suggestion box in the lunch area and a 
formal plant-wide employee involvement program both count as a ‘suggestions system’ 
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in the BNA survey yet the latter clearly involves much more expenditure and is a far 
more intensive use of HRM.  For this reason, this dissertation will use the log of a firm’s 
expenditures on HRM to measure its utilization (demand) for HRM.   
 
Independent Variables 
The HRM demand function shown in equation 8 shows that HRM is predicted by 
several factors, including technology, market prices, the prices of other factor inputs, the 
use of other factor inputs and a vector of control variables (Xi).  Recall that this equation 
reflects the assumption made in the previous chapter that the price of HRM and the cost 
of capital do not vary across firms.  Assuming that the price of HRM and K are fixed, the 
variables fall out of the estimating equation.  This is necessary as a practical matter since 
no firm level data are available on the v variable. 
Next, because of data limitations, it is not possible to specify all of the theorized 
internal and external characteristics in Xi as shown in Chapter III in the final estimating 
equation; however, the majority of the theorized independent variables are included.  
After augmenting the BNA survey data with information from other sources using firms’ 
NAICS codes, we are left with a dataset that provides information on every firm’s non-
labor operating costs, the demographic, occupational and knowledge characteristics of 
their workforce, the sector in which the firm operates (public/non-profit/private), the 
level of the surveyed department in the organization, union activity, labor and product 
market characteristics, the strategic role of the HR department within the firm, and the 
degree to which a firm has a philosophy favoring the provision of a high level of HRM 
activities for its employees.  Table 3 classifies each of these variables according to their 
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corresponding “shift variable” detailed in the second section of Chapter III, their 
predicted relationship with the demand for expenditures on HRM practices and where the 
data come from (e.g., the BNA, BLS or EEOC).  Table A.1, found in the Appendix to this 
dissertation details how all of the industry-level information was gathered.  In the event 
that the data come from the BNA, the relevant survey question is shown in parenthesis in 
the table below - the letter refers to the section of the survey and the number corresponds 
to the question within that section.  The next table, Table 4, shows the summary statistics 
for these independent variables. 
 
Table 3. Definition and Predicted Signs of the Independent Variables 
Independent Variable Theoretical Shift Variable 
Predicted 
Sign  Source 
Log of average annual wages (F.1 and D.1) Wages ? BNA
Log of the number of full time employees (D.1) Firm Size ? BNA 
Dummy variable measuring the firm’s focus on 
overall employee satisfaction and morale (C.3)* 
Management 
Philosophy + BNA 
Log of non-labor operating costs per worker (F.1) Production Technology ? BNA 
Dummy variable=1 if organization is a non-profit 
entity (A.1)** 
Organizational 
Characteristics - BNA 
Dummy variable=1 if organization is a 
government entity (A.1)** 
Organizational 
Characteristics + BNA 
Dummy variable=1 if the organization is service 
oriented (i.e., a non-manufacturing entity) (A.1) 
Production 
Technology + BNA 
Index relating the HR department’s influence in 
the firm’s strategic decisions (recode of C.2 so 
that 5 is high involvement) 
Strategic 
Involvement + BNA 
The percentage of workers that belong to a union 
(A.10) Unionization ? BNA 
Percent of labor that is female Workforce 
Demographics 
? EEOC
Percent of labor that non-white ? EEOC 
Percent of labor with a Bachelors degree Knowledge Characteristics ? BLS
 
Percent of workers that are white collar  Occupational Characteristics ? EEOC 
State-Industry unemployment rate Labor Market Characteristics - BLS 
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Dummy variable=1 if the HR department resides 
in the central corporate office (A.8) 
Level of HR 
Department + BNA 
Log of the Coefficient of Variation in 
Employment from 1991-2005 
Product 
Market 
Characteristics
? BLS 
Rate of separations per 100 workers ? BLS 
*Firms that mark the second box in this question receive a score of 1. 
**The baseline group here is all for-profit private firms.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Specified Independent Variables (381 Observations) 
Specified Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Log of annual wages  10.49 1.35 4.47 15.20 
Log of the number of full time employees  6.74 1.58 3.78 13.82 
Dummy variable=1 if the firm’s HRM is focused 
on overall employee satisfaction and morale  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Log of non-labor operating costs per worker  9.41 2.45 1.35 15.49 
Dummy variable=1 if organization is a non-profit 
entity 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Dummy variable=1 if organization is a 
government entity 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Dummy variable=1 if the organization is service 
oriented (i.e., a non-manufacturing entity)  0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Strategic Involvement of the HR Department 
(index from 1-5 where 5 is highest)  3.85 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Percentage of workers that are in a union  10.02 18.95 0.00 65.00 
Percent of labor that is female 51.25 17.67 0.54 82.20 
Percent of labor that non-white 33.35 9.56 14.50 99.32 
Percent of labor with a Bachelors degree 19.01 9.19 8.00 33.00 
Percent of workers that are white collar  62.73 21.46 10.92 99.27 
State-Industry unemployment rate 5.06 1.03 2.70 10.40 
Dummy variable=1 if the HR department resides 
in the central corporate office 0.31 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Log of the Coefficient of Variation in 
Employment from 1991-2005 -2.16 0.50 -4.47 -1.62 
Rate of separations per 100 workers 37.35 17.65 15.20 75.50 
 
 
Age, the competitiveness of the product market, the level of government 
intervention and the degree of centralization in the firm are four variables which are not 
included in the empirical model due to lack of data availability. Unfortunately, there was 
no way to gain access to data for the age for each firm so this predictor of the use of 
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HRM could not be specified in the empirical model.  The second variable which is 
omitted is the market concentration of the industry in which the firm operates. While 
there is detailed industry level market concentration data available for many firms, there 
is no data for agricultural, mining, construction or public entities which reduces the total 
sample size of the dataset used in this dissertation by 15%.  Using this restricted dataset 
the coefficient on the market concentration variable is never found to be significant, and 
reduces the significance of the results of the rest of the model.   Therefore, the omission 
of the market concentration variable in Xi is justifiable in that its inclusion creates 
problems (i.e., costs) without yielding any additional information (i.e., benefits).   The 
remaining two variables, the level of government regulation in the firm’s industry and the 
degree of centralization in the firm’s organizational structure are not included in the 
model specification because these shift factors are hard to quantify.   
When we incorporate the aforementioned modifications into the theoretical model 
we are left with the following estimating equation (equation 8’) that can be used to 
evaluate the firm’s demand for HRM expenditures.  In the next section, the econometric 
techniques used to estimate this equation are detailed.  Then, in the subsequent section, 
this empirical model is modified to account for the econometric issues that it presents, 
including reporting error bias that could cause negative spurious correlation (i.e., division 
bias) and omitted variable bias.  After correcting the model for these issues it is re-
estimated to see if the estimated coefficients are stable and robust.  If the results of the 
modified specifications are not notably different from the initial benchmark model, then 
we can assume that it is reasonable to use the results from estimating equation (8’) to 
make inferences regarding the firm’s HRM choice process. 
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Empirical Methodology 
 
The Aggregate Demand for Expenditures on HRM Practices 
The methodology used to estimate the firm’s HRM demand function shown in 
equation 8’ uses two complementary techniques: ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
quantile regression (QR) analysis.  The reason that both methods are used is that they 
work together to provide comprehensive results.  In particular, the quantile analysis is 
able to check to see if the OLS estimates are correct for the entire sample population.  
When the OLS estimates are not valid, inference is made using the results from the 
quantile analysis.  The reason that the results from the quantile analysis are not solely 
used is that the OLS results are more straightforward to report and interpret.   
Accordingly, the first step of the empirical methodology used in this dissertation 
is to estimate the firm’s demand for expenditures on HRM practices using OLS.  The 
statistical package we use first adjusts the data for any potential intra-industry 
correlation(s).14  To do this, then we use STATA and cluster the standard errors on the 
firms’ NAICS industry codes at the 2-digit level.   While informative, OLS results only 
reflect the behavior of the ‘average firm’, and thus are not necessarily representative of 
every firm in the population.   
                                                 
14 It makes sense to control for intrastate correlations since the choice of HRM practices may be a function 
of the location of the firm as it indicates something about culture and thus managerial philosophy and the 
use of practices.   
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To check to see if the OLS estimates are representative of the behavior of firms 
with regard to conditional expenditures on HRM practices, a QR analysis is performed.  
In contrast to OLS which only evaluates the covariates at the conditional mean, the key 
aspect of the QR methodology is that the influence of the covariates on the demand for 
HRM is evaluated at different points along the conditional distribution, called quantiles.  
Consequently, the interpretation of the coefficients estimated using QR analysis present a 
new interesting perspective because one can interpret the results as rates of return or 
‘prices’ of the independent variables on HRM at different points along the distribution 
(Machado and Mata 2005, 447).  In addition, a second related advantage of the QR 
methodology is that the estimated coefficients are relatively unaffected by the presence of 
outliers in the dataset (Koenker and Hallock 2001; Madalozzo 2002).  Thus, as it pertains 
to this dissertation, engaging in QR analysis is worthwhile since it is designed to handle 
the very broad range of expenditures on HRM practices that includes several outliers with 
relatively high levels of expenditure.   
The specific specification of the QR model used in this study is based on the work 
of Machado and Mata (2005) who provide a clear presentation of the methodology, as 
originally developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978).  The model can be summarized as 
follows:  Suppose Qθ(hrm│x) for θε(0,1) represents the level of HRM expenditures of 
firms in the θth quantile of the frequency distribution of HRM expenditures, and x 
represents the vector of covariates outlined above as well as a constant term.  Within this 
framework each quantile is estimated using the following specified model: 
 
Qθ(hrm│X) = x′β(θ)) 
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where β(θ) is the vector of coefficients corresponding to the θth quantile of the 
distribution.  Β(θ) is estimated by minimizing the following equation with respect to β: 
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Once the coefficients of each covariate have been estimated for several of the 
quantiles, it is possible to draw a graph which plots the magnitude of the coefficients as a 
function of their quantile.  In doing this, it is possible to see if the covariate has a stronger 
or weaker impact on the demand for HRM in a given region of the distribution by 
observing if the coefficients are getting larger or smaller in magnitude as HRM 
expenditures increase.  If the magnitudes of the coefficients do not plot an increasing or 
decreasing trend, then one can say that the OLS results are reasonable for all firms and 
should be used for making inferences.  However, if the opposite is true, then the OLS 
results only predict the HRM expenditures of firms whose expenditures are similar to the 
conditional mean of the sample population.  In this situation, the estimated results of the 
quantile analysis are used since they are able to explain the behavior of all firms whereas 
OLS cannot.  Thus, the quantile analysis complements the explanatory power of OLS 
results in that (a) it identifies which coefficients on the independent variables in the HRM 
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demand function are estimated correctly by OLS; and (b) it provides reliable estimates on 
the explanatory variables on interest where OLS does not apply. 
 
Disaggregating the Demand for Expenditures on HRM Practices 
While the results of the model specification described above are very useful and 
serve as a benchmark for estimating the firm’s overall demand for expenditures on HRM 
practices, it is also interesting to disaggregate the analysis by examining sub-components 
of the HRM expenditure variable.  This secondary line of inquiry is explored in this 
chapter by estimating nine additional equations that use more narrow measures of HRM 
expenditures as the dependent variable.  In particular, the new dependent variables are the 
log of expenditures per employee on recruitment, training, compensation, benefits 
administration, employee relations, external relations, personnel management, health and 
safety activities and strategic planning.  As is the case with the aggregated model, an 
OLS regression model is used to estimate these specifications; however, these regressions 
are not also estimated using the quantile methodology.  The reason that quantile analysis 
is not used is because it is not needed to determine whether the size and sign of the 
explanatory variables change for different types of HRM practices.   
 
Results 
 
 The author will first report the QR results, followed by the OLS results.  This is 
done to reveal to what degree the OLS results are accurate estimates of the coefficients of 
the model.  Figure 4.3 plots the distribution created by the QR estimates of each 
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independent variable taken at eleven different points along the conditional distribution of 
expenditures on HRM.  The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval of the 
estimates, and the solid skinny line represents the estimates of the median quantile.  The 
thick horizontal line represents the mean (OLS) estimates.  If the OLS estimate for a 
given variable is closely approximated by the distribution created by the QR estimates 
then it is fair to use the coefficient estimated using OLS to characterize all firms in the 
economy.  However, if there is substantial variation along the distribution the QR results 
should be used for inference.   
 
Figure 5 Plots of the Quantile Regression Estimates 
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Figure 5 shows that none of the independent variables have QR coefficients that 
plot a distribution that is notably different from OLS estimate is the level of unionization 
in the firm.  Therefore, we can assume that the mean (OLS) regression does a very good 
job of estimating the marginal effect of the covariates on the expenditures on HRM.  The 
strong similarity between the quantile and OLS estimates is an important finding in that it 
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implies that the mean estimates from OLS can be used to generalize the behavior across 
all firms with respect to their HRM choices.   
Table 5 reports the mean estimates for all of the model specifications.  The first 
column shows the estimated coefficients for the “total” or “aggregate” HRM demand 
function (using total firm level HRM expenditures); columns 2-10 show the results for 
disaggregated HRM demand functions.  The aggregate and disaggregated demand 
functions are estimated using OLS.   
In the following paragraphs the estimated coefficients that are statistically 
significant are discussed in detail for all ten model specifications.  However, before 
elaborating on the estimated coefficients of the independent variables, it should be noted 
that the regression equation itself is statistically significant in all ten specifications, as is 
demonstrated by the p-values shown in the last row of Table 5.  This result is noteworthy 
because it supports the use of the HRM demand function as an analytical tool for 
predicting firms’ HRM choices and, therefore, provides empirical proof in favor of the 
economics-based approach to understanding firms’ HRM choices.  In addition, a standard 
Chow test of the disaggregated specifications shows that there is in fact significant 
variation in the estimates across different HRM practice types for all but two of the 
specifications (i.e., that the demand for HRM expenditures varies depending on the HRM 
practice type).  This finding indicates that the estimated coefficients from the 
disaggregated specifications provide additional information not revealed in the 
aggregated equation (Column 1), and therefore justifies the inclusion of the nine 
disaggregated equations in the present empirical analysis of the demand for HRM.  Please 
see Table A.2 in the Appendix for the results of the Chow test.
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Table 5. Results of the OLS Specifications (n = 381 Observations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
COEFFICIENT Total Expenditure Recruitment Training 
Compen- 
sation 
Benefits 
Admin. 
Employee 
Relations 
External 
Relations 
Personnel 
Mgt. 
Health and 
Safety 
Strategic 
Planning 
Log of -0.307*** -0.218*** -0.307*** -0.357*** -0.312*** -0.301*** -0.302*** -0.342*** -0.320*** -0.258*** 
Employment (0.0263) (0.0402) (0.0339) (0.0458) (0.0359) (0.0423) (0.0511) (0.0422) (0.0463) (0.0450) 
Log of Wages 0.186*** 0.257*** 0.220*** 0.166*** 0.230*** 0.243*** 0.257*** 0.169*** 0.234*** 0.273*** (0.0345) (0.0548) (0.0464) (0.0613) (0.0476) (0.0577) (0.0746) (0.0549) (0.0667) (0.0604) 
Log of Capital 
Intensity 
0.0700*** 0.0528* 0.0772*** 0.0748** 0.0511* 0.0926*** 0.0629* 0.0601** 0.0944*** 0.0246 
(0.0197) (0.0300) (0.0247) (0.0341) (0.0267) (0.0312) (0.0372) (0.0300) (0.0348) (0.0322) 
Unionization -0.00109 -0.00277 0.000758 -0.00229 0.00492 0.00113 -4.67e-05 0.00104 0.00438 -0.00395 (0.00221) (0.00355) (0.00297) (0.00399) (0.00307) (0.00366) (0.00455) (0.00369) (0.00404) (0.00440) 
HPWS Ideology 0.225*** 0.425*** 1.417*** -0.389*** 0.0661 0.295** -0.0317 0.224* 0.164 0.226 (0.0837) (0.127) (0.105) (0.148) (0.116) (0.132) (0.163) (0.134) (0.152) (0.144) 
Non-profit Entity -0.273 0.683 0.00152 -0.739 -0.491 0.513 0.315 0.511 0.241 0.782 (0.269) (0.418) (0.346) (0.490) (0.386) (0.416) (0.567) (0.441) (0.559) (0.500) 
Government Entity -0.317* 0.0338 0.0405 -0.0624 -0.313 -0.215 -0.00171 -0.209 -0.343 0.122 (0.187) (0.285) (0.242) (0.329) (0.255) (0.296) (0.372) (0.289) (0.332) (0.334) 
Service Oriented Firm -0.410** -0.0942 -0.346 -0.889*** -0.674*** 0.00351 -0.000461 -0.0937 0.0189 -0.0273 (0.188) (0.285) (0.243) (0.330) (0.253) (0.298) (0.348) (0.291) (0.343) (0.312) 
Unemployment -0.0308 0.0186 -0.0369 -0.0294 -0.0701 -0.00559 -0.0562 -0.0297 -0.0578 0.0243 (0.0381) (0.0579) (0.0475) (0.0664) (0.0516) (0.0607) (0.0734) (0.0580) (0.0659) (0.0653) 
Strategic Interaction 0.0374 0.0493 0.0693 -0.0443 -0.0753 0.0960 0.0428 0.0513 -0.0395 0.0987 (0.0385) (0.0592) (0.0490) (0.0687) (0.0537) (0.0613) (0.0737) (0.0615) (0.0703) (0.0689) 
Log of Rate of 
Separations 
0.264** 0.369* 0.306* 0.719*** 0.647*** -0.00813 0.319 -0.149 -0.0921 -0.0206 
(0.134) (0.205) (0.174) (0.244) (0.186) (0.219) (0.290) (0.225) (0.267) (0.256) 
Log of  Var. in 
Employment 
-0.165 -0.0652 -0.178 -0.224 -0.247 0.00492 -0.212 -0.0481 -0.0541 0.0115 
(0.108) (0.174) (0.143) (0.206) (0.155) (0.204) (0.293) (0.196) (0.256) (0.264) 
White Collar 0.00230 0.0119** 0.00181 0.00139 0.00532 0.00505 -0.0123 0.00189 -0.00604 0.00167 (0.00344) (0.00521) (0.00431) (0.00601) (0.00469) (0.00533) (0.00784) (0.00545) (0.00605) (0.00570) 
Bachelors Degree 0.681* -1.043 1.141 0.499*** 0.641** -2.310 1.159 -0.187 0.157 0.0121 (0.131) (2.229) (1.862) (0.179) (0.217) (2.385) (1.895) (2.360) (2.680) (2.548) 
Percent Women 0.00865* 0.00826 0.00242 -4.10e-07 0.0107* 0.00449 0.00390 -0.000254 0.00103 -0.00332 (0.00447) (0.00673) (0.00568) (0.00772) (0.00602) (0.00696) (0.00919) (0.00701) (0.00800) (0.00764) 
Percent Minority 0.00189 -0.000608 0.00299 0.00900 0.00292 0.00361 -0.00483 -0.00305 -0.00601 0.00281 (0.00569) (0.00871) (0.00715) (0.00989) (0.00770) (0.00891) (0.0139) (0.00879) (0.00949) (0.00978) 
Corporate Level -0.0236 -0.00853 -0.133 -0.194 0.333** -0.150 -0.325* -0.00691 -0.293 -0.189 (0.103) (0.156) (0.130) (0.183) (0.143) (0.160) (0.191) (0.169) (0.184) (0.176) 
R-squared 0.474 0.302 0.569 0.332 0.391 0.358 0.431 0.320 0.354 0.321 
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Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Column (1) of Table 5 shows that nine of the seventeen independent variables are 
statistically significant determinants of the firm’s aggregate demand for per employee 
HRM expenditures.  Two of these variables, the log of employment and the log of 
average annual wages, are found to be statistically significant in all ten of the model 
specifications.  Employment, as measured by the average number of fulltime employees, 
is found to have a negative relationship with the firms’ expenditures on HRM practices.  
The results in column (1) show that a 1% increase in the size of a firm’s labor force leads 
to a 0.307% decrease (on average) in expenditures on HRM practices per employee.  
Note that this figure is given in the log differential form as are all of the results in this 
section including dummy variables and non-marginal changes in continuous variables.15  
In addition, the magnitude of this relationship is found to relatively uniform across the 
remaining nine model specifications regardless of the type of HRM expenditures.  
Because the relationship is negative, it indicates that per capita HRM expenditures 
decrease with firm size.  This is presumably because firms benefit from economies of 
scale when providing HRM practices and thus have lower provision costs, and not that 
the demand for HRM services per worker are lower in larger companies.  In fact, if we 
assume that larger firms unequivocally require more HRM services per employee, ceteris 
paribus, then the estimated coefficient of 0.307 provides a lower bound of the level of 
economies of scale (i.e., a firm’s costs decrease by at least 31% when they double the size 
of their labor force). 
The second variable which is found to be statistically significant in all ten 
equations is the wage variable, which measures as the firm’s total payroll costs divided 
by employment.  The estimated coefficients are positive indicating that the wage rate is a 
                                                 
15 To change the results to actual percentages one must utilize the following formula: (eβ-1)100.    
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complement for HRM practices. This result supports the idea presented in the second 
section of Chapter III that firms often pay employees a higher than market wage to 
complement other HRM practices, such as in a high performance work system (e.g., 
teams, employee involvement, etc…).    
Next, the variable measuring the non-labor operating costs of the firm per 
employee is found to be positive in all equations and statistically significant in all but 
one.  The magnitudes of the results are relatively consistent across all the specifications, 
corresponding to roughly a .07% increase in HRM expenditures per employee for every 
1% increase in non-labor operating costs per employee.  Interestingly, the coefficient with 
the highest magnitude is that which corresponds to employee relations.  This result 
supports Begin’s (1997) claim that firms who utilize technologically advanced systems of 
production require a high level of liaison services since these services are provided 
through employee relations practices like disciplinary and compliance procedures, 
employee communications, suggestion systems and union/labor relations. 
The management philosophy of the firm is the fourth variable that is determined 
to be a statistically significant predictor of firms’ HRM choices.  The equation shown in 
column (1) shows that management with an HPWS philosophy will have aggregate HRM 
expenditures that are 23% higher than all other firms on average.   Next, focusing on the 
significant results in columns (2)-(10), we see that expenditures on recruitment, training 
and employee relations practices are higher when the philosophy of the firm is to use 
HRM to improve overall employee satisfaction and morale.  This result is in accordance 
with the predicted relationship.  On the other hand, this type of managerial philosophy is 
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also found to decrease the expenditures on compensation in a statistically significant way 
by 39% on average.  
The dummy variable that represents governmental organizations is also found to 
be statistically significant in the “total” specification shown in column (1).  The sign of 
the coefficient is negative in contrast to what is predicted in the second section of Chapter 
III.  Rather than having a high level of HRM expenditures that promote fairness, 
standardize practices and so on, we find that on average governmental organizations 
actually expend less on HRM practices.  One potential explanation for this result is that 
governmental entities are able to utilize economies of scale in producing and delivering 
HRM services by streamlining administrative practices across various agencies (e.g., 
payroll, pensions and other fringe benefits).  
The next variable whose estimated coefficients are statistically significant is the 
dummy variable that represents service oriented firms.  Looking at Table 5, we see that 
the firm’s aggregate expenditure on HRM is negatively related to the utilization of HRM.  
In addition, the equations that express the demand for expenditures on training as well as 
compensation and benefits administration also produced significant coefficients on this 
dummy variable.  The result in the equation measuring firm expenditures on training 
makes sense given that manufacturing firms tend to use machinery requiring firm-specific 
skills. Conversely, service workers like accountants, lawyers, barbers and chefs have 
transferable (and sometimes credentialed) skills that can be used in many firms.  It is hard 
to find a specific explanation for the results found in columns (1), (4) and (5).  Perhaps 
the negative coefficients in these equations are a result of the technology of production or 
some other confounding factors of these firms.   
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Next, the rate of separations in the firm’s industry is positively related to 
aggregate expenditures on HRM practices.  In addition, when looking at the 
disaggregated equations, we find that the rate of separations is a statistically significant 
predictor of expenditures on recruitment, training, compensation administration and 
benefits administration.  As it pertains to the stated hypotheses in Chapter III, all of these 
estimates go against the empirical evidence presented by Messersmith (2008) and Bayo-
Moriones (2002).  However, the result in column (2) is not so surprising because does 
support the theoretical claim made in Wright and Snell (1998) that firms with high 
turnover rates demand a higher level of recruitment practices to deal with their frequent 
hiring and firing of employees.  
The estimated coefficient on the variable representing the percentage of workers 
who have a Bachelors degree is positive.  This finding clarifies the predicted relationship 
shown in Table 3.  As is expected, firms that employ workers who are more educated 
have greater incentive to establish internal labor markets that require a high level of 
expenditures on HRM practices.  Specifically, a one percent increase in the percentage of 
employees with a Bachelors degree increases the overall expenditures on HRM by 0.68%.  
The same increase in educational background of the workforce also leads to increased 
expenditures on compensation administration and benefits administration practices in the 
magnitude of 0.50% and 0.64%, respectively. 
With respect to the demographic characteristics of the labor force, we find that the 
percentage of women in the workforce leads to higher firm expenditures on HRM 
practices.  In the previous chapter, this relationship is hypothesized to exist because firms 
with a high proportion of women will have a higher demand for HRM practices like 
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dispute resolution programs and policies that educate workers about sexual harassment 
and discrimination.  The results of the disaggregated specifications neither confirm nor 
contradict this hypothesis (i.e., the coefficient in the employee relations equation shown 
in column (6) is not statistically significant); however, they do present an additional 
alternative explanation for the high demand for HRM demonstrated by firms that have a 
high proportion of female employees.  Column (5) shows that there is a significant 
positive relationship between female employees and expenditures on benefits 
administration.  In retrospect, this result is not so surprising since this classification of 
expenditures takes into account the substantial costs borne by firms due to maternity 
leave and childcare costs. 
In addition to the above results, there are two independent variables which are not 
statistically significant in the “total” specification shown in column (1), but are found to 
be significant in at least one of the disaggregated specifications shown in columns (2)-
(10).  The first of these variables is percentage of workers whose jobs classify as white 
collar positions.  While the coefficient on the percentage white collar variable is not 
significant in column (1), it is significant in two of the nine disaggregated specifications.  
Specifically, we find that the expenditures on external relations are decreasing with the 
percentage of white collar employees.  In contrast, the expenditures on recruitment 
practices are positively related to the percentage of white collar employees.   
A second variable found significant only in the dissagregated equations is the 
variable indicating whether the HR department resides in the corporation’s central office 
or in a division or branch.  The results show that the level of expenditures on benefits 
administration is higher in a corporate HR department, but the expenditures on health and 
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safety practices are higher in an HR department located in a branch or divisional office.  
This makes sense considering that a firm would concentrate benefits administration in a 
central location to capitalize on economies of scale, while something like safety training 
would need to be performed in a more decentralized fashion to account for the intricacies 
of each plant or division of a firm.  
 
Testing for Mis-specification  
 
The results from estimating the HRM demand function provide a wealth of 
information, as detailed above.  However, it is important to check that the results are 
statistically well-specified.  One possible source of mis-specification that the inclusion of 
the employment variable on the right hand side creates a division bias since employment 
is also used as the denominator for the dependent variable.  While this issue is not 
thought to be of great significance due to the absence of measurement error in the dataset 
used to specify the employment variable, it is still necessary to make sure that its 
inclusion on the right hand side of the estimating equation is not driving the results of the 
regressions (Borjas 1980, 411). 
To validate the assumption that employment is exogenous in the HRM equations, 
the model is estimated using an instrumental variables (2SLS) methodology which is 
shown in Column (2) of Table 6, and the variable is dropped altogether in the third 
column of Table 6.  In the 2SLS specification, the employment of the firm is predicted 
using the historical trend in employment for the industry in which the firm operates.  
More specifically, using the Arellano-Bond methodology, the employment for each firm 
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is instrumented by using lagged values of employment for the industry for the five years 
preceding 2005, as well as the associated year to year differences (Arellano and Bond 
1991).  The results from this estimation are then compared to those generated by OLS 
(Column (1)).   If the instruments are shown to be appropriately specified and the 
coefficients estimated in both regressions are not statistically different from one another, 
then we can say that the model is unaltered by the inclusion of instrumental variables.  
Furthermore, this result would imply that there is no reason to use the 2SLS.  Such a 
finding is desirable for the purposes of this dissertation because computationally it is very 
difficult to estimate a quantile regression analysis that includes instrumental variables. 
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Table 6. Results of the OLS and 2SLS Specifications 
COEFFICIENT OLS 2SLS Dropped 
Log of Employment -0.30*** -0.55*** 
 
(0.03) (0.14)  
Log of Average Annual Wages 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.25*** (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Log of Non-Labor Oper. Costs per Employee 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Percent of Employees w/ Union 
Representation 
-0.01* -0.01* -0.01** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HPWS Ideology 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.19** (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Strategic Interaction of HR Dept w/ Firm 0.04* 0.05** 0.02** (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Dummy=1 if HR Dept  is at the Corp. Level -0.03 0.07 -0.14 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) 
Dummy=1 if Government Entity -0.31** -0.32** -0.29** (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) 
Dummy=1 if Nonprofit -0.26 -0.30 -0.21 (0.27) (0.30) (0.31) 
Dummy=1 if Serivce Oriented Firm -0.41** -0.46** -0.34** (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) 
Rate of Unemployment (Industry-State) -0.03 -0.08 0.03 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Log of Separations per 100 Employees 0.26** 0.23* 0.42*** (0.10) (0.13) (0.16) 
Log of Variation in Employment (1990-2004) -0.16 -0.10 -0.24* (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
Percent of Employees that are White Collar 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent of Employees that Have a Bachelors 
Degree 
0.68*** 0.51*** 1.64*** 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.67) 
Percent of Employees that are Women 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Percent of Employees that are Minority 0.00 -0.00 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 381 381 381 
R-squared 0.474 0.276 0.348 
Prob>F; Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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The results of the first stage equation of the 2SLS procedure are shown in Table 7 
and the exogeneity tests for the 2SLS specification are shown in Table 8.  The first 
important finding is that the first stage results are significant.  Next, the instruments used 
are shown to be uncorrelated with the error term according to the Sargan and Basmann 
tests of overidentifying restrictions.  Specifically, the test statistics fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  In addition, the 
estimated test statistic for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level.  This indicates that lagged values of employment for the 
firm’s industry, as well as the associated year to year differences, are valid instruments.   
 
Table 7. First Stage Results for 2SLS 
VARIABLES Ln(Employment) 
L.1 0.00444** (0.00223) 
D.1 (dropped) 
L.2 (dropped) 
D.2 -0.0125** (0.00556) 
L.3 0.00259 (0.00260) 
D.3 (dropped) 
L.4 -0.00710*** (0.00236) 
D.4 -0.00488*** (0.00154) 
Constant 6.922*** (0.143) 
Observations 381 
R-squared 0.230 
Prob>F 0.0370 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: L.1 and D.1 refer to the first lagged value and first 
difference.  L.2 refers to the second lagged value and so on. 
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Table 8. Testing the Validity of the Instruments in the 2SLS Specification 
Sargan statistic: 5.01 chi-sq(4) P-value = 0.2934 (test of overidentifying restrictions)   
Basmann statistic: 4.82 chi-sq(4) P-value = 0.3011 (test of overidentifying restrictions)   
Wu-Hausman F-statistic: 5.29  F(1,373)    P-value = 0.02200 (test for endogeneity)   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic: 5.47  chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.01930 (test for endogeneity) 
 
 
With this result in hand, the next step in determining if the estimates of the HRM 
demand function are robust to the use of the 2SLS methodology is to see if the regression 
results from the OLS and 2SLS methodologies are statistically different from one 
another.  Table 9 provides the results of a hypothesis test that determines if the estimates 
produced by the IV and OLS models are statistically different.   
 
 
Table 9. Test for Difference in OLS and 2SLS Estimates (Ho: βOLS- β2SLS ≠ 0) 
Variable of Interest chi2(1) 
Log of Employment 2.04 
Log of Non-Labor Operating Costs per Employee 0.97 
Log of Firm’s Mean Annual Wage 2.50 
Unionization 2.13 
High Demand Ideology 1.59 
Non-Profit Entity 2.02 
Government Entity 1.46 
Non-Manufacturing Entity 7.96* 
Strategic Interaction of the HRM Department 2.03 
Rate of Separations 2.51 
Rate of Unemployment 1.98 
Log of the Coefficient of Variation in Employment 1.25 
Percent of White Collar Employees in Workforce 2.00 
Percent of Workers With a Bachelors Degree 2.14 
Proportion of Women in the Workforce 1.26 
Proportion of Minorities in the Workforce 10.44* 
Corporate Level 3.16 
*Significant at 5% 
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In reviewing the results, we see that that the coefficients of the OLS and 2SLS 
only vary in a significant way for the dummy variable for non-manufacturing entities.  
Thus, just one of the ten statistically significant independent variables estimated in these 
models has coefficients that are impacted in any significant way by using OLS rather than 
2SLS.  Furthermore, while significant, this difference is neither substantial nor 
meaningful in terms of its marginal effect on the demand for HRM.  Both the OLS and 
2SLS methods produce significant results.  In addition, in both cases the estimated 
coefficients on the ‘non-manufacturing’ dummy variable are negative and have a similar 
magnitude.  In particular, the difference in expenditures on HRM in manufacturing firms 
versus non-manufacturing firms is 0.04% and 0.05% for the OLS and 2SLS methods, 
respectively.   
The next source of bias which can be tested is omitted variable bias.  As is stated 
in the “Specifying the Estimating Equation” section of this chapter, there are a few 
independent variables that are not included in the regression equation because of a lack of 
data availability.  To see if the absence of these variables impacts the regression 
coefficients, the regression equation is re-specified by removing all of the industry-level 
and industry/state-level independent variables (i.e., those that do not come from the BNA 
dataset), and replacing them with industry and regional control variables.  The following 
table, Table 10, reports the estimates of this specification in Column (1) and then includes 
the overlapping variables that are also estimated in the benchmark specification (i.e., 
Column (1) of Tables 4.3 and 4.4) in Column (2).  
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Table 10. Estimations Including Industry and Regional Dummy Variables1 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Log of Employment -0.293*** -0.307*** (0.0261) (0.0263) 
Log of Average Annual Wages 0.194*** 0.186*** (0.0341) (0.0345) 
Log of Non-Labor Operating Costs 
per Employee 
0.0738*** 0.0700*** 
(0.0192) (0.0197) 
Percent of Employees w/ Union 
Representation 
-0.012* -0.010* 
(0.00635) (0.00498) 
HPWS Ideology 0.209** 0.225*** (0.0835) (0.0837) 
Strategic Interaction of HR Dept w/ 
Firm 
0.0345** 0.0364* 
(0.0155) (0.0185) 
Dummy=1 if HR Dept  is at the 
Corp. Level 
-0.0424 -0.0236 
(0.101) (0.103) 
Utilities 0.520*  
(0.311)  
Construction -0.651**  
(0.290)  
Trade and Transportation -0.169  
(0.268)  
Manufacturing 0.0635  
(0.147)  
Information 0.299  
(0.184)  
Professional Services 0.173  
(0.155)  
Education -0.371**  
(0.181)  
Healthcare 0.0661  
(0.156)  
Other 0.190  
(0.168)  
North East -0.0523  
(0.245)  
Middle Atlantic -0.227  
(0.237)  
North Central -0.250  
(0.236)  
South Atlantic 0.0481  
(0.263)  
South Central -0.252  
(0.303)  
Mountain -0.121  
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(0.328)  
Observations 381 381 
R-squared 0.502 0.474 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
1 Public Entities and the Pacific Region are Omitted to Identify the Model 
 
Focusing on the independent variables that are common to both regressions (e.g., 
the first seven independent variables), we can clearly see that there is little to no variation 
in the estimates that are statistically significant across specifications.  A hypothesis test is 
shown in Table 11 that demonstrates that there are no statistical differences in the six 
statistically significant independent variables. 
 
Table 11. Test for Difference in OLS and 2SLS Estimates (Ho: βOLS- βdummies ≠ 0) 
Variable of Interest chi2(1) 
Log of Employment 1.45 
Log of Non-Labor Operating Costs per Employee 1.01 
Log of Firm’s Mean Annual Wage 0.94 
Unionization 1.98 
High Demand Ideology 2.22 
Strategic Interaction of the Firm 1.67 
HR Department at the Corporate Level 5.31* 
 
 
In the end, the estimated coefficients from the alternative specifications added in 
this section show that the inclusion of level of employment on the right-hand side is not 
influencing the results in any material way and that there is minimal omitted variable 
bias.  The important implication of these results is that it supports the use of the 
benchmark equation that specifies employment on the right-hand side.  As a result, it is 
reasonable to use OLS when estimating the HRM demand curves as represented by the 
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function expressed in equation 8’.  More importantly, the results of this alternative 
specification support the claim that this approximation of the HRM demand curve is a 
statistically significant predictor of the use of HRM in all firms. 
 CHAPTER V 
IDENTIFYING SYSTEMS OF HRM PRACTICES 
 
In Chapter III an economics-based model is presented that predicts variation in 
the optimal use of HRM across firms and provides an explanation of the observed shape 
of the HRM frequency distribution.16  A second theoretical contribution of Chapter III is 
found in the next to last section where the model is extended to explain firms’ optimal 
mix (or “bundle”) of HRM practices.  The question that is addressed in this chapter is: do 
firms choose HRM bundles that can be categorized by a relatively small number of 
distinct configurations – earlier called “employment systems”, or are these bundles so 
heterogeneous that they elude categorization?  The theoretical model developed in 
Chapter III suggests bundles of HRM practices will indeed form into discrete 
employment systems if (1) the marginal product of individual HRM practices varies 
systematically across firm production systems and economic/organizational 
characteristics (e.g., assembly line versus craft production, reliance on internal versus 
external labor markets) and (2) if there are distinct complementarities among HRM 
practices.  
As described in the Literature Review chapter (Chapter II), several authors (e.g., 
Mintzberg 1983; Begin 1997; Marsden 1999; Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. 2000; Black and 
Lynch 2001; Guthrie 2001) have argued that HRM practices will group into distinct 
employment systems and some of them have developed hypotheses that predict the 
characteristics of a few distinct employment systems that can categorize the use of HRM 
                                                 
16 In Chapter IV this theoretical prediction was empirically tested and the results show that the HRM 
demand function is a useful tool for determining the firm’s demand for expenditures on HRM practices.   
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in all firms.  For example, Begin distinguishes five different employment systems (ES): 
They include (1) the simple structure where workers are managed through the use of 
direct supervision; (2) the machine bureaucracy in which a standardized technological 
process controls worker output; (3) a professional bureaucracy where firms hire workers 
with accredited skills and then give them freedom to practice their trade with little 
supervision or direction; (4) the adhocracy system where firms are only focused on 
improving worker effort and motivation so that they can maximize innovation; and (5) 
the divisionalized form used by large organizations where each division in this class of 
firm will have its own specific needs and is thus delegated the power to manage its own 
HRM activities.   
It was also noted in Chapter II that no study to date has empirically tested any of 
these theoretical hypotheses.  My dissertation is the first to do so, and it is to this subject 
that we will discuss in this chapter.  My research plan is to take the BNA dataset and use 
the statistical technique of cluster analysis to empirically determine if firms’ bundles of 
HRM practices sort into distinct systems.  To implement this test the author uses Begin’s 
model of five ES’s.  Ideally, it would be nice to be able to compare the results of the 
cluster analyses for Begin’s model against the typology of ES’s developed by other 
authors (e.g., Osterman 1987, Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. 2000); however, the 
characterizations of ES’s by other authors are based on variables which are either 
immeasurable or not included in the BNA dataset.  The present cluster analysis is 
performed by partitioning 264 firms according to the percentage of their HRM budget 
that they allocate to each of nine categories of HRM practices, including recruitment, 
training, compensation administration, benefits administration, employee relations, 
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external relations, personnel management, health and safety activities, and strategic 
planning.  The firm-level information used in this analysis comes from the BNA dataset 
(see section E, question 3 of the survey in the Appendix).   
If the cluster analysis can partition firms into a few groups, the next step will be to 
utilize the HRM demand function to predict the firms’ choice of employment system.  In 
the following sections, the methodology used to carry out the cluster analysis and 
subsequently estimate the choice of employment system are explained in detail.  The 
third section provides the results of the cluster analysis. 
 
A Methodology for Determining the Systems of HRM Practices Used in Firms 
 
The methodology used to perform the cluster analysis is conducted in a similar, 
albeit more sophisticated, fashion to the analysis of ES’s in steel-mills reported in 
Manufacturing Advantage: Why High-Performance Work Systems Pay Off (Appelbaum, 
Bailey, et al. 2000).   In their study, Appelbaum, Bailey et. al. utilize a K-clustering (non-
hierarchical) technique that partitions firms into a few discrete groups.  In order to 
perform a K-clustering method one must a priori choose the number of groups into which 
all the observations are partitioned (g), and define a point of reference that serves as the 
starting point of each cluster (called a centroid).  One weakness of the method used in 
Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. (2000) is that the authors specify both the number of clusters 
and the centriods in what they concede to be a somewhat arbitrary way, basing them 
solely on theoretical predictions.  The methodology used in this study advances this 
approach by going one step further and utilizing a hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
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technique to predict the number of clusters and the centroids that are used to specify the 
K-clustering procedure.  By adding this step to the clustering process, the clustering 
method is improved because it eliminates the previous approach to specifying the number 
of groups and their centroids.   
The reason that clusters formed using hierarchical clustering cannot be used on 
their own for making inferences is that the procedure has many steps, and objects merged 
at any step of the process are never unmerged at subsequent steps.  As a result, the 
grouping at each step is conditioned on the set of clusters formed during previous 
clustering steps.  In the end, this can lead to situations in which the similarity of objects 
that are clustered together is less than would be the case if the unmerging of clusters were 
permitted.17  On the other hand, the results offered by K-clustering avoid this issue by 
optimizing the intra-cluster dissimilarity in a single step and, as a result, are preferred to 
those generated using an agglomerative clustering technique.  That said, using the less-
than-optimal solution offered by agglomeration clustering “…usually gives a near 
optimal solution that is good enough for most purposes (Romesburg 1984).”  Because the 
results from the agglomerative process are “near optimal” they are used to specify the K-
clustering technique in lieu of the process described by Appelbaum, Bailey, et al. (2000).  
Thus, in the end, the use of both clustering techniques is wise as they work together to 
produce the best possible results.   
Given the just-described relationship between these two clustering methods, the 
first step in this cluster analysis is to perform a hierarchical agglomerative cluster 
analysis.  Agglomeration clustering begins by assuming that each firm comprises its own 
                                                 
17 The way in which this issue arises will become more apparent once the hierarchical clustering 
methodology is explained in more detail below. 
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cluster (i.e., there are n initial clusters), and ends with all firms being part of the same 
cluster.  The process by which n clusters are agglomerated into a single cluster takes n-1 
steps.  In each step, the two clusters which are the least dissimilar are fused together to 
create a single cluster.  This process continues until there is only one cluster remaining 
(Duran and Odell 1974).   
The technique used to measure the (dis)similarity between clusters in this analysis 
is Ward’s clustering procedure.  Ward (1963) argues that the best way to determine 
which two clusters should be merged together is to minimize the amount of information 
that is lost during each step of the clustering process.  To accomplish this, in each of the 
n-1 steps, the potential information loss is measured for every potential union of the 
existing clusters by calculating the error sum-of-squares (K).  Then, the cluster pairing 
whose combination results in the smallest increase in K is chosen, and the process repeats 
itself until all firms have been condensed into a single cluster.  A single step in this 
process is represented in the functional form shown in the optimization equation shown 
below.  Ward’s method minimizes this function with respect to K n-1 times in order to 
agglomerate all objects into a single cluster (Bijnen 1973). 
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In the present analysis s represents the set of nine percentages that represent the 
distribution of expenditures on HRM which are used to cluster the firms; g represents the 
set of clusters and r represents the set of firms that are clustered.  As a result,  is the rsgy
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value of the s-th percentage for the r-th firm in cluster g, and  is the number of firms in 
cluster g. 
gn
 The main issue with hierarchical clustering, as noted above, is that firms in a 
group cannot be unmerged once they are clustered together.  The reason that this is a 
problem is that the “average” firm in each cluster, known as its “centroid”, changes 
whenever a new firm is added to the group.  As a result, there is potential for situations in 
which firms that are partitioned into a given cluster early in the process may actually be 
more similar to a different cluster at later stages of the analysis.  Unfortunately, when this 
occurs, similarity of objects that are grouped together at the end of the cluster analysis is 
less than would be the case if the unmerging of firms were permitted after each step of 
the process. 
The next step in the clustering methodology is to choose the number of groups 
that provides the best fit for the data.  This number of clusters can be identified by using a 
dendrogram.  Visually, the dendrogram looks like a typical tree diagram that graphs K on 
the vertical axis (see Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6. An Example of a Typical Dendrogram 
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At the bottom of the dendrogram the measure of K is zero and there are n nodes (in 
Figure 6 n=20).  As we move up the graph, the dissimilarity of observations within each 
cluster, K, increases.  In the end, the graph looks like a series of steps leading to the 
single cluster of firms at the top of the figure.  To determine the number of clusters, g, 
that provides the best fit for the data one must find the agglomerative step where there is 
relatively little to gain from reducing the number of total clusters.  This point is shown on 
the dendrogram as a large increase in K or a “sharp step” from one number of clusters to 
the next (Everitt 1993; Kraznowski 2000).   
After this point is established and g is known, the next step is to specify the 
centroids that are used as starting points in the K-clustering portion of this cluster 
analysis.  To identify these points of reference, g groups of firms are formed using 
Ward’s agglomerative clustering method.  Then, the centroid of every cluster of firms is 
calculated as the intra-cluster mean for each of the nine variables which are used to 
partition the firms.  That is, the centroids are each a vector of nine percentages that relate 
how firms in a particular cluster tend to distribute their HRM budget on average.   
In this dissertation, K-clustering is performed using a mathematical procedure that 
minimizes intra-cluster dissimilarity called the K-means technique.  As has been stated 
previously, one must specify the number of clusters and their centroids to begin the K-
means clustering technique.  Once specified, the K-means technique partitions the firms 
by placing them in the group whose centroid is most similar to their distribution of 
expenditures on HRM practices.  This is accomplished by calculating the squared 
Euclidean distance between a firm’s distribution of expenditures on HRM practices and 
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the centroids, and subsequently assigning the firm to the centroid that minimizes this 
value.  The equation shown below demonstrates this choice process.  Here,  
represents the squared Euclidean distance of each firm, i, to its centroid, c(i). 
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Once the firms have been grouped by optimizing this equation, the centroids for 
the clusters are recalculated and the firms are re-clustered using the same equation.  If 
any of the firms move from one cluster to another, the centroids are recalculated and the 
firms are accordingly re-clustered using equation 5.2.  The K-means clustering method is 
complete when no firms move between clusters.  The main benefit of clustering the firms 
using the K-means techniques as opposed to using agglomeration clustering is that the 
methodology it clusters all firms in a single step.  Therefore, the results are not subject to 
bias from mistakes made in previous steps as is the case with hierarchical agglomerative 
clustering (Anderson 1980; Everitt 1993).   
The end product of the clustering analysis is a set of g clusters that are able to 
characterize all firms according to their distribution of expenditures on HRM practices.  
In other words, g discrete groups are created and each contains a group of firms that use 
their HRM budgets in a similar way.  Thus, we can think of each cluster as a group of 
firms that utilize roughly the same system of HRM practices.  As a consequence, 
observing the characteristics of each cluster answers the second research question posed 
in this dissertation as it sheds light on the actual HRM systems used by firms.   
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Results of the Cluster Analysis 
 
 The first step in evaluating the cluster analysis is to choose the number of groups 
that best fits the data using the dendrogram shown in Figure 7.  To make this decision a 
bit easier, the differences in dissimilarity are traced on the vertical line on the right hand 
side of the figure.  Restricting the potential number of clusters to six, the dendrogram 
shows us that the greatest changes in dissimilarity occur between 2 and 3 clusters and 4 
and 5 clusters.  The reason that the number of clusters in the dendrogram is restricted to 
six is because the purpose of this exercise is to determine a small number (a few) of 
discrete ES’s that can categorize all firms.   
After considering the fact that the level of intra-group dissimilarity is very high 
when there are only two clusters of firms, it becomes apparent that partitioning the firms 
into 4 clusters provides the best fit for this dataset.  The characteristics of each of these 
four clusters are shown in Table 12.  For the remainder of this chapter they will be 
referred to as Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4.  The fact that the dataset shows that the firms neatly 
sort into four groups is important because it addresses the “classification problem” that 
has proven to be an obstacle for researchers in this field in the past (see page 31 of 
Chapter II for a more detailed explanation of this issue).  In fact, the results of the cluster 
analysis identify a specific set of HRM systems used in practice.  This is in contrast to the 
HRM literature which has yet to empirically establish a set of HRM systems that can 
classify all firms (Black and Lynch 2001). 
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Figure 7. Dendrogram of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 
 
 
 
Table 12. Percentage of HRM Budget Allocated to Each Practice  
by the Average Firm in Each Group of Firms 
HRM Practice 
Group 1   
(78 obs) 
Group 2   
(67 obs) 
Group 3   
(63 obs) 
Group 4   
(56 obs) 
Population 
Average 
(264 obs) 
Recruiting 15.08 16.68 15.02 15.44 15.55 
Training 7.32 10.76 11.07 9.02 9.54 
Compensation 23.08 15.62 15.74 13.55 17.00 
Benefits Administration 22.71 22.08 21.77 25.51 23.02 
Employee Relations 4.74 5.00 5.38 6.40 5.38 
External Relations 1.34 1.69 2.46 1.80 1.82 
Health and Safety 3.61 3.91 3.60 4.30 3.78 
Personnel  3.18 3.64 4.24 3.55 3.65 
Strategic Planning 2.92 4.47 4.10 3.41 3.97 
Note: Groups 1-4 refer to clusters of firms that are formed by the cluster analysis when the optimal number of 
clusters is assumed to be 4 (as is suggested by the dendrogram in Figure 7).
  
 
Before comparing these results to Begin’s hypothesis, and prior to estimating the 
firm’s choice of employment system using the HRM demand function, it makes sense to 
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characterize the four groups of firms that are generated by the clustering process.  First, 
relative to the other groups, Group 1 focuses its attention on compensation practices 
while using a small portion of the overall HRM budget on the other eight HRM practice 
types as compared to the rest of the firms in the dataset.  Group 2 distinguishes itself by 
allocating a relatively large portion of its HRM budget to recruiting and strategic 
planning practices, and otherwise has a fairly average distribution of HRM expenditures.  
Next, in comparison to the other three groups of firms, Group 3 spends a relatively small 
portion of its budget on benefits administration practices, but chooses to allocate a larger 
than average percentage of expenditures on training, external relations and personnel 
management.  Finally, Group 4 is characterized by a relatively high percentage of HRM 
expenditures on benefits administration and employee relations practices; however, the 
firms in this cluster tend to use compensation practices with less intensity that firms 
which are partitioned into the other three clusters. 
 
 An Evaluation of Previously Hypothesized Systems of HRM 
 
One purpose of performing this cluster analysis is to use the identified groups of 
firms from the previous section to empirically test for the existence of the theorized HRM 
systems described by Mintzberg (1983).  To make such a comparison, we rely on the 
hypotheses of Begin (1997) who argues that there are certain characteristics common to 
all firms that utilize the same type of employment system.  Specifically, he characterizes 
what he considers the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, the professional 
bureaucracy and the adhocracy system according to the degree of formalization with 
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which they use HRM practices to recruit, train, provide benefits, appraise performance 
and engage in employee relations.  In addition, for each employment system, Begin 
predicts the firms’ level of employment (i.e., size), degree of unionization, level of 
integration of the HR department with the firm’s overall organizational strategy and the 
degree to which firms formalize their HRM practices in aggregate.  Table 14, below, 
outlines his predictions.  Unfortunately, the variation in intensity within the divsionalized 
form category means that it can not be easily distinguished using cluster analysis and, as a 
result, we must focus on the other proposed systems when conducting the cluster 
analysis.  In the end, this assumption should have little bearing on the final placement of 
firms into clusters since the divisionalized firms are most likely distributed somewhat 
equally across each of the HRM systems excluding the simple structure.  This is a result 
of the divisionalized form being nothing more than the addition of two other systems 
being implemented simultaneously in separate divisions of one firm. 
 
Table 13. Predicted Characteristics of HRM Systems 
Firm Characteristic Simple Structure 
Machine 
Bureaucracy
Professional 
Bureaucracy 
Adhocracy 
System 
Recruiting (Staffing) LI LF LI EF 
Training N/LI LI N EF 
Benefits (Rewards) LI EF EI EF 
Performance Appraisal/Management N/LI LF LF EF 
Employee Relations (Liaison Devices) Few  Few Moderate Many 
Size of Labor Force Small Large Varies Varies 
Unionization No Yes No Yes 
Integration with Org. Strategy N N/LI N/LI EF 
Degree of Formalization** Little  Much Little Much 
*Definitions: N - none, LI - limited (informal), LF- limited (formal), EI - extensive (informal), EF - extensive (formal) 
Source: Table 2-2 and Chapter 5 of Begin (1997) 
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In Table 13, four of the nine firm characteristics are measured on a scale that 
shows whether a given type of HRM practice is expected to be non-existent (N), limited 
and informal (LI), limited and formal (LF), extensive and informal (EI), or extensive and 
formal (EF).  While it is clear that N, LI and EF represent low, moderately low and high 
demand respectively, the two remaining categories (i.e., LF and EI) are more difficult to 
distinguish.  Each of these measures connotes a use of HRM that is moderate or 
moderately high.  Thus, they are thought of as being equivalent for the purposes of 
carrying out this cluster analysis.  In general, it is reasonable to expect some overlap 
between the different levels of this scale because the categories are so broad.  To quantify 
these predictions, each of these five measures of the use of individual HRM practices is 
specified using a six point scale.  N is given a score of 1-2 to connote a use of HRM that 
is well less than average, while LI is given a score of 2-3 to represent utilization of HRM 
that is moderately below average.  Similar to N, EF is given a score of 5-6 because it 
suggests that a particular HRM practice type is used with an intensity that considerably 
higher than average.  As is noted in the previous paragraph, LF and EI are assumed to be 
synonymous for the purposes of this analysis and represent moderate (3-4) to moderately 
high (4-5) usage of HRM.  As such, these measures are given a score of 3-5 in the present 
scales. 
In addition to the above measures of the use of individual HRM practices, this 
table also uses the six point scale to define a range for the terms used to characterize the 
other five aspects of each of these four employment systems.  First, employee relations 
practices are measured according to whether there are a few, a moderate number, or many 
practices in the firm.  Because these categories neatly break down into three discrete 
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groups there is no overlap in their scaled scores.  In particular, “Few” is given a score of 
1-2, “Moderate” is given a score of 3-4, and “Many” is given a score of 5-6.  Next, Begin 
characterizes the size of the labor force, the level of unionization and the degree of 
formalization variables using descriptors that are binary (e.g., Small or Large, No or Yes, 
and Little or Much).  Interpreting these measures in this way, it makes sense to simply 
indicate whether or not the variable in question is greater or less than the population 
average.  As a result, to scale these variables we assign a score of 1-3 to “Small”, “No” 
and “Little”, and 4-6 for “Large”, “Yes” and “Much.”.  Finally, the strategic involvement 
variable is characterized by Begin in the same way as the first four variables (i.e., N, LI, 
LF, EI or EF), and therefore follows the same scaling process.  Table 14 summarizes this 
scaling procedure. 
 
 
Table 14. Conversion Chart 
Begin (1997) 
Terminology 
Numeric 
Range 
N 1,2 
LI 2,3 
LF 3,4,5 
EI 3,4,5 
EF 5,6 
Few 1,2 
Moderate  3,4 
Many 5,6 
Small 1,2,3 
Large 4,5,6 
No 1,2,3 
Yes 4,5,6 
Little  1,2,3 
Much 4,5,6 
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Using this conversion chart we can rewrite Table 13 as Table 15 so that it is 
comparable to a scaled version the results of the cluster analysis (see below for the 
method used to scale the results of the cluster analysis). 
 
 Table 15. Quantifying the Hypotheses of Begin (1997) on a Scale of 1-6 
Firm Characteristic Simple Structure 
Machine 
Bureaucracy
Professional 
Bureaucracy 
Adhocracy 
System 
Recruiting 2,3 3,4,5 2,3 5,6 
Training 1,2,3 2,3 1,2 5,6 
Benefits Administration 2,3 5,6 3,4,5 5,6 
Personnel Management 1,2,3 3,4,5 3,4,5 5,6 
Employee Relations 1,2 1,2 3,4 5,6 
Employment 1,2,3 4,5,6 Varies Varies 
Unionization 1,2.3 4,5,6 1,2,3 4,5,6 
Strategic Involvement 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 5,6 
Degree of Formalization 1,2,3 4,5,6 1,2,3 4,5,6 
 
 
In order to compare these predictions to the actual characteristics of the firms in 
each group identified by the cluster analysis it is necessary to identify the “firm 
characteristics”, as shown in Table 15, for each cluster and then convert these figures to a 
six point scale.  Using the BNA dataset, the author is able to specify all nine of these 
characteristics using firm-specific information.  The first five factors are measured using 
the firms’ expenditures per capita on recruitment, training, benefits administration, 
personnel management and employee relations HRM practices.18  Next, similar to the 
specification in Chapter IV, the employment variable is measured by the average number 
of employees in the firm during 2005, and the strategic involvement variable is measured 
using a five point index.  The unionization variable is specified as the percentage of 
                                                 
18 In contrast to the regression analysis in Chapter IV, we can specify the firms’ formalization of a given 
HRM practice type as their per capita expenditures without causing any potential statistical problems.   
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workers in a firm that are represented by a union.  Finally, the degree of formalization, 
which is believed to approximate the firm’s demand for HRM, is measured using the 
firms’ aggregate expenditures on HRM practices per worker.  Of course, the level of 
aggregate expenditures on HRM is not a perfect measure of the utilization of HRM 
practices; however it is the best measure available.  As is explained in more detail in 
Chapter IV, the cost of providing HRM practices is hypothesized to decrease with firm 
size due to economies of scale, density and scope.  Empirically, we interpret the 
estimated coefficients on the employment variable as suggestive that firms do experience 
rather substantial reduced costs in providing HRM practices as they grow in size.  Table 
16 shows each cluster’s average values for all nine firm characteristics on which the 
comparison of the cluster analysis results and Begin’s hypotheses is based. 
 
 
Table 16. Characteristics of the Average Firm in  
Each of the Clustered HRM Systems 
Firm Characteristic  Group 1   (78 obs) 
Group 2   
(67 obs) 
Group 3     
(63 obs) 
Group 4   
(56 obs) 
Population 
Average   
Population 
St. Dev.  
Recruiting 223.55 660.53 341.03 513.88 395.43 992.54 
Training 119.69 288.55 138.18 530.35 293.37 942.59 
Benefits Administration 515.96 481.72 521.39 998.71 667.29 2506.66 
Personnel Management 46.22 126.62 39.06 119.65 84.17 246.58 
Employee Relations 99.21 154.09 50.09 220.50 138.31 414.20 
Employment 1209.57 881.54 3124.59 1566.84 1666.55 5379.92 
Unionization 0.29 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.44 
Strategic Involvement 3.24 3.52 3.61 3.92 3.71 1.08 
Degree of Formalization 1676.05 3349.71 3851.98 6543.09 3572.21 15193.44 
Note: Groups 1-4 refer to clusters of firms that are formed by the cluster analysis when the optimal number of clusters is 
assumed to be 4 (as is suggested by the dendrogram in Figure 7).
 
 
Before it is possible to make a comparison to Begin’s predictions we must scale 
these results from the cluster analysis.  The scaling process used here is relatively 
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straightforward since the results of the cluster analysis are already characterized using an 
ordinal measure.  The scale is determined in the following manner.  First, the mean and 
standard deviation are calculated for each of the nine characteristics for the entire 
population of firms.  These terms are represented by μj and σj, respectively, with j = {1, 2, 
…, 9}.  Then, the mean values of these nine variables are determined for each cluster.  
These values are given by the term cij where i represents the cluster, gi (i.e., i = 
{1,2,…,g}), and j represents the nine characteristics (i.e., j = {1,2,…,9}).  Finally, each cij 
is assigned a score of 1-6, referred to as vij so they are comparable to the predictions 
shown above.  This is done by using μj and σj to determine the value of cij relative to the 
rest of the population of firms in the dataset.  The criteria used to determine each vij is as 
follows:   
if…  
cij < μj – 0.25*σj ,      then vij = 1 
μj – 0.25*σj < cij < μj – 0.1*σj ,    then vij = 2 
μj – 0.1*σj < cij < μi ,     then vij = 3 
μj < cij < μi + 0.1*σj ,     then vij = 4 
μj + 0.1*σj < cij < μj + 0.25*σj ,   then vij = 5 
cij > μj + 0.25*σj ,      then vij = 6 
 
 
Therefore a value of vij = 1 implies that the per employee expenditures on recruitment 
practices for a particular group of firms are less than 0.25 standard deviations from the 
population average.  Similarly, a value of vij = 2 indicates that the group’s average level 
of per employee expenditures on recruitment practices is between 0.10 and 0.25 standard 
deviations from the population mean. The reason that a difference of 0.1 and 0.25 
standard deviations from the population mean are used as the threshold values for 
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creating this scale is because they create differentiation in the results.19  Table 17 shows 
the results of the scaling process.  After this scaling is complete, it becomes possible to 
make a direct comparison between the results of this cluster analysis and the predicted 
HRM systems found in Begin (1997).   
 
Table. 5.6. The Scaled Characteristics of the Average Firm in Each Cluster 
Firm Characteristic Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Recruiting 2 6 3 5 
Training 2 3 2 6 
Benefits Administration 3 3 3 5 
Personnel Management 2 5 3 5 
Employee Relations 3 4 2 5 
Employment 3 2 6 2 
Unionization 4 2 4 4 
Strategic Involvement 1 2 3 5 
HR Expenditures 2 3 4 4 
Note: Groups 1-4 refer to clusters of firms that are formed by the cluster analysis when the 
optimal number of clusters is assumed to be 4 (as is suggested by the dendrogram in Figure 7). 
 
  
To execute the comparison, each group of firms created by the cluster analysis is 
compared to each of the predicted ES’s shown in Table 15.  For example, the values for 
the nine specified firm characteristics for Group 1 are placed side by side with the 
predicted values for each of the four described ES’s.  Then the process is repeated for 
Group 2, Group 3 and Group 4.  After comparing the results of the cluster analysis to the 
characteristics the simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and 
adhocracy system employment systems proposed by Mintzberg and Begin, we find that 
each cluster of firms closely approximates one of the identified employment systems.  
                                                 
19 Other values were also tried such as 1.0 and 0.5 standard deviations, and 0.5 and .25 standard deviations, 
but scaling the variables using these values provided little or no variation across the four groups of firms. 
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Furthermore, each group provides a good fit for a different ES.  Specifically, the 
summary statistics of Group 4 are in line with the suggested nature of firms who utilize 
the adhocracy system for all nine characteristics.  Groups 1, 2 and 3 also all closely 
approximate hypothesized employment systems.  In particular they have similar 
characteristics to the simple structure, professional bureaucracy and machine 
bureaucracy, respectively.  However, unlike Group 4, these groups of firms are not 
completely in line with Begin’s theoretical predictions.  The factors which are not in line 
with Begin’s predictions are summarized in the following table, Table 18. 
 
Table. 5.7. Comparing the Use of HRM Practices and Firm Characteristics for Each 
Cluster to the Hypotheses of Begin (1997) 
Number of Group 
from Cluster 
Analysis Results 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Type of HRM 
System  
Simple 
Structure  
Professional 
Bureaucracy 
Machine 
Bureaucracy 
Adhocracy 
System 
Exception(s) 
Employee 
Relations, 
Unionization 
Recruitment 
and Training 
Practices 
Benefits 
Administration 
Practices 
None 
  
  
 
Because the four groups of firms generated by the cluster analysis so closely 
approximate four of the ES that are theorized by Begin, we can take one additional step 
and see if the characteristics of the groups are in accord with the fundamental 
characteristic(s) of each ES detailed in the first part of this chapter.  These hypotheses are 
listed again below. 
H1 : Simple structure firms control workers with managerial supervision 
H2 : Machine bureaucracy firms control workers with the technology of 
production 
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H3 : Professional bureaucracy firms hire credentialed workers and then take a 
hands off approach 
H4 : Adhocracy system firms focus on improving the AMO of workers 
 
To test the first of these hypotheses, industry information is gathered at the 3-digit 
NAICS level from the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on the 
percentage of workers that are managers.  The data show that the mean percentage of 
workers that are managers in firms that utilize the simple structure is 11.01% in 
comparison to the rest of the population which has a mean value of 11.71%.  On the 
surface, this result contradicts H1; however, this difference is not statistically significant 
and, therefore, we cannot conclude that the percentage of workers that are managers in 
firms that utilize the simple structure is less than the rest of the population.  Thus, in the 
end, the results are inconclusive regarding the first of the listed hypotheses. 
The next hypothesis, H2, states that firms that implement a machine bureaucracy 
ES will control workers with their technology of production.  In practice, it is quite 
difficult to test this hypothesis because one must to identify all the elements and 
complexities of the firm’s production process.  However, we can approximate this 
relationship by observing the level of non-labor operating expenses (e.g., capital expenses 
on plant, machinery and raw materials) of the firms in this group, Group 3, relative to the 
rest of the population.  This measure is used to test this hypothesis because a firm that 
makes a relatively large investment in its capital infrastructure has more incentive to 
establish an environment in which the investment can have high returns.  As a result, a 
firm will have more incentive to focus its personnel practices around the technology of 
 
126 
 
production so that it operates efficiently and maximizes profits.  The mean level of the 
log of non-labor operating expenses is slightly higher for firms in Group 3 versus the rest 
of the population (10.23 vs. 9.83); however, as was true with the previous result, this 
difference is not statistically significant and so it is not possible to make inference from 
this finding. 
H3 argues that firms that use an ES that is representative the professional 
bureaucracy function by hiring capable individuals and then allowing them to operate 
with little supervision.  Following the same method as was used to test H1, data from the 
EEOC is used to see if firms in Group 3 have fewer managers as a proportion of the 
workforces on average as compared to the rest of the population.  In contrast to this, we 
find that firms that utilize a professional bureaucracy ES have a higher proportion of 
managers by roughly 8% (12.61% vs. 11.71%), and that this difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
To investigate the fourth hypothesis, H4, we must establish whether or not 
improving the effort and motivation of the workforce is the principle goal of the firms 
that are in Group 4.  To approximate this, information is used from the BNA survey 
which asks respondents if satisfaction and morale are considered by top management as 
most important when evaluating the merit of the HR department (see the Appendix for a 
copy of the BNA survey).  The data show that 33% of the firms in Group 4 consider 
improving employee satisfaction and morale to be top management’s priority when 
evaluating the HR department, which is significantly20 greater than the mean value for 
the firms that are in Groups 1, 2 and 3 (26.7%). 
                                                
 
 
20 This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Estimating the HRM Demand Function 
 
After clustering firms together that use similar systems of HRM and comparing 
them to the hypothesized typologies of Begin (1997), the next step is to determine why a 
firm chooses to use a particular HRM system versus others.  By applying the HRM 
demand function to this aspect of the firm’s HRM choice, we can attempt to identify what 
causes firms to choose one system over another.  The HRM demand function is shown 
below (see Chapter III for a derivation and detailed explanation of this mathematical 
expression).   
 
L
HRM  = f (A, P, L, K, v, r, w, Xi)     
 
 
Adapting this function to the present situation, the dependent variable in the HRM 
demand function becomes the cluster that the firm chooses (i.e., gi where i = 1, …, g).  
The set of independent variables used to predict this decision is the same as those which 
are used in Chapter IV to determine the firm’s expenditures on HRM practices.  In total, 
there are seventeen internal and environmental characteristics of each firm that 
theoretically influence their costs and benefits from utilizing HRM practices.  They 
include the size of the firm’s workforce, wages, capital intensity, the demographic, 
occupational and knowledge characteristics of the workforce, the sector in which the firm 
operates (public/non-profit/private), the level of the surveyed department in the 
organization, union activity, labor and product market characteristics, the strategic role of 
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the HR department within the firm, and the degree to which a firm’s ideology that favors 
the provision of a high level of HRM activities for its employees.  Please refer to the 
second section of Chapter III for a detailed description the theoretical relationship of each 
of the independent variables with the use of HRM, and see Table 3 of Chapter IV for a 
list of the sources used to populate the dataset.  The specific econometric method used to 
estimate this model is the multinomial logit approach.  This is appropriate since the 
dependent variable is a series of unrelated outcomes which are all predicted by the same 
set of independent variables.   
 Table 19 shows the results of the HRM demand function that estimates the firms’ 
choice of employment system using the multinomial logit technique.  The base outcome 
in this estimation is Group 1.  In general, it makes sense to use this group of firms as the 
base group since the other three identified employment systems all use HRM with more 
intensity than the simple structure.  As is seen in the table, the HRM demand function’s 
ability to predict the firms’ choice of employment system is somewhat reduced compared 
to the predictive power of the HRM demand function to explain the firms’ choices 
regarding aggregate and disaggregated expenditures on HRM practices.  For example, the 
sign of the coefficients for each independent variable is consistent for six of the specified 
independent variables across the three specifications.  This subset of variables includes 
employment, wages, governmental entity, service oriented firm, strategic interaction and 
level of the HR department in the firm.  Even though this group of variables is relatively 
small, we find that the coefficients of this subset of estimates are consistent with the 
hypotheses regarding all of the variables except for the dummy variable that represents 
firms that are governmental entities.  Next, no more than two of the seventeen 
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independent variables are found to be statistically significant determinants of the firms’ 
choice to implement a given HRM system.  In contrast to this, ten variables were found to 
be statistically significant determinants of the firms’ aggregate expenditures on HRM 
practices.  In addition, the reduced explanatory power of the HRM demand function for 
explaining the firms’ choice of HRM system is also seen by observing the R-squared 
terms of the specifications.  This number, which reflects the amount of variation in the 
demand for HRM that is "explained" by the regressors, is 0.474 when the dependent 
variable is the aggregate expenditures on HRM practices, but is only 0.145 when the 
dependent variable reflects the firms’ choice regarding their system of HRM practices. 
In retrospect, the reduction of explanatory power if the HRM demand function in 
explaining this aspect of firm choice is not so surprising since the construct of the HRM 
demand function is geared towards predicting the utilization of HRM practices in terms 
of magnitude rather than type.  Similar to the K and L inputs, the HRM variable in the 
production function relates the magnitude of the input and not its type.  For example, the 
labor demand function predicts the number of full time employees or labor hours required 
for production, but it does not address different types of workers.  In fact, when there are 
different types of an input (e.g., blue-collar and white-collar workers) they should be 
included as separate inputs in the production function and their demand, and its 
magnitude, should be evaluated separately (Berndt and Christensen 1973; Berndt and 
Christensen 1974). 
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Table 19. Results of the Multinomial Logit Regression1 
VARIABLES Group2 Group3 Group4 
Log of Employment 0.180 0.237 0.257 (0.240) (0.245) (0.266) 
Log of Capital Intensity 0.200 -0.121 0.0294 (0.264) (0.185) (0.154) 
Log of Wages 0.315 0.928* 1.159*** (0.585) (0.503) (0.379) 
Unionization 0.521 -0.239 0.0362 (0.645) (0.608) (0.597) 
HPWS Ideology -0.230 0.334 0.366 (0.708) (0.681) (0.698) 
Unemployment 0.127 -0.205 -0.502 (0.519) (0.407) (0.428) 
Non-Profit Entity 0.664 -2.54*** -1.562 (1.801) (0.770) (1.739) 
Governmental Entity -2.268 -1.574 -1.352 (1.948) (1.531) (1.777) 
Service Oriented Firm 0.235 1.060 0.322 (1.947) (1.698) (1.777) 
Strategic Interaction 0.549* 0.145 0.355 (0.331) (0.281) (0.296) 
Log of Rate of Separations -2.324** -1.782 0.117 (1.141) (1.428) (0.928) 
Log of  Var. in Employment -0.0306 0.519 -0.380 (0.770) (0.626) (0.534) 
White Collar -0.0324 0.00461 -0.0156 (0.0356) (0.0268) (0.0179) 
Bachelors Degree 8.330 -2.048 2.413 (22.07) (12.02) (12.58) 
Percent Women -0.0363 -0.0400 0.00579 (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0419) 
Percent Minority -0.00735 -0.00707 0.0100 (0.0282) (0.0254) (0.0342) 
Corporate Level 0.0441 0.185 0.449 (0.604) (0.752) (0.697) 
1 Base outcome is Group 1, R-Sq. = 0.145 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Note: Groups 1-4 refer to clusters of firms that are formed by the cluster analysis when the 
optimal number of clusters is assumed to be 4. 
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Even though there is little that we can say with relative certainty based on the 
estimated coefficients from this regression equation, there are some observations which 
can be made.  In particular, Groups 3 and 4 contain firms that tend to pay a relatively 
high wage on average, and non-profit firms are less likely to join Group 3.  Furthermore, 
the firms in Group 2 are characterized by HRM departments that have a high level of 
interaction in their respective firms’ strategic choices, and are located in industries that 
have a relatively low level of employee turnover.   
In the end, the results of the cluster analysis are able to partially answer the 
second research question stated in Chapter I which asks how firms will distribute their 
chosen level of HRM expenditures.   After determining that separating the firms into four 
groups provides the best fit for the data, each firm is assigned to a cluster with firms who 
made similar choices when allocating their HRM expenditures to nine different practice 
types.  Observing the characteristics of these four groups we can make some 
generalizations about a discrete set of four systems of HRM practices used by the firms in 
the dataset.  However, while we can definitively say that firms separate into four groups 
that have distinct characteristics, the HRM demand function is not able to predict the 
firm’s choice when it comes to selecting one of these four HRM systems.  Even though 
this result is not ideal, the fact that the cluster analysis does neatly partition the firms into 
four groups is substantial, indicating that there are a few HRM systems (i.e., employment 
systems) that characterize the distribution of HRM expenditures in all firms.   
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Summary  
 
 The results of the cluster analysis performed in this chapter show that there is a 
discrete set of four HRM systems that characterize the practices used in all firms.  This 
finding suggests that there is no “best practice” HRM system toward which all firms 
gravitate; rather, the cluster analysis shows us that each firm chooses to implement one of 
four types of ES’s.  In addition to evaluating the second stated research question, the 
results of the cluster analysis are useful because they allow us to test the hypothesized set 
of ES’s described by Begin (1997).  To enable such an evaluation, it is first necessary to 
scale Begin’s predictions and the results of the cluster analysis so that they are 
equivalent.  The results of this comparison show that groups of firms created by the 
cluster analysis provide a good fit for the hypothesized HRM systems described by 
Begin.  
Next, the HRM demand function is estimated to try to determine the exogenous 
factors that cause a firm to choose one ES over the rest.  As is shown in Table 19, the 
results of this regression are not informative.  Thus, in the end, the results of this analysis 
are only able to partially address the second research question stated in Chapter I since 
they do not explain the causal factors of this aspect of firms’ HRM choices.  This result 
also signals the need for a sophisticated model that can better approximate the firms’ 
choice of employment system since the relatively simplistic economics-based model here 
is unable to do so. 
   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Firms utilize human resource management (HRM) practices to effectively 
coordinate and administer their workforces with the ultimate goal of maximizing profits.  
There are two related aspects of the use of HRM practices that are investigated in this 
dissertation.  The first is to determine why some firms expend a great deal of resources 
on HRM practices for each employee while others spend very little.  The second is to 
determine if the HRM systems firms choose aggregate into distinct types of employment 
systems, and what factors influence this choice.  Over the years, researchers in the fields 
of management, psychology, economics and industrial relations have attempted to 
theorize these aspects of the use of HRM practices in firms, yet none of the existing 
models or theories are very analytical or command widespread acceptance.  In this study, 
the author brings to bear on these issues a new microeconomics-based model developed 
by my dissertation chair, Bruce Kaufman (2004; 2008).  It models HRM as a factor input 
into production and posits that differences in the productivity and profitability of HRM 
cause firms to choose different levels of HRM.  This prediction is consistent with the 
HRM frequency distributions shown in Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and A.1.  The model also 
shows that complementarities among individual HRM practices can give rise to distinct 
employment systems. 
This dissertation seeks to test these implications of the theory.  The first step is to 
estimate the HRM demand curve where the firms’ expenditures on HRM practices per 
employee are the dependent variable.  On the right hand side of this equation are a 
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number of independent variables which the theoretical model and the literature suggest 
will influence the demand for HRM.  They include the size of the firm’s workforce, 
wages, non-labor operating costs per employee, the demographic, occupational and 
knowledge characteristics of the workforce, the sector in which the firm operates 
(public/non-profit/private), the level of the surveyed department in the organization, 
union activity, labor and product market characteristics, the strategic role of the HR 
department within the firm, and the degree to which a firm’s management philosophy 
favors the provision of a high level of HRM activities for its employees.   
The results of this estimation are twofold.  First, the overall regression equation is 
found to be statistically significant.  This means that the collection of independent 
variables is able to successfully explain part of the variation in HRM practices across 
firms.  Second, there are nine independent variables, or “shift factors”, which are 
statistically significant and thus identify individual determinants of firms’ HRM demand.  
They include the number of employees in the firm (employment), average annual wage 
rate, level of non-labor operating costs per employee, managerial philosophy, sector (e.g., 
government, service), rate of separations, level of education and the proportion of women 
in the workforce. 
In addition to estimating the influence of these independent variables on the 
firms’ aggregate HRM expenditures, nine additional specifications are estimated where 
the dependent variable is specified as the total expenditure per employee on specific 
HRM practice types.  These disaggregated demand functions are able to show to what 
extent the independent variables have common effects across individual HRM practice 
categories.  The results show that there are only two independent variables (employment 
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and wages) that have a relatively stable influence on the demand for HRM for all nine 
practice types.  For the rest of the independent variables, these additional specifications 
produce coefficients that show variation in statistical significance, magnitude and/or sign 
across HRM practice types.  The additional model specifications are also useful because 
they identify two independent variables (the proportion of white collar workers in the 
firm and if the HR department resides in the firm’s corporate headquarters) that are not 
statistically significant in predicting aggregate expenditures on HRM per employee, but 
are stable determinants of the demand for individual practice types. 
After estimating both the aggregated and disaggregated versions of the HRM 
demand function, the dissertation next examines whether firms’ HRM practices bundle 
into discrete employment systems.  Thus, Chapter V utilizes a cluster analysis and finds 
that the distribution of expenditures on individual HRM practice types partitions firms 
into four groups, each of which represent a different employment system.  By observing 
the level of usage of each type of HRM practice in each of the four groups it becomes 
possible to identify complementarities between types of HRM practices.  This provides 
suggestive evidence that there are complementarities that exist in this grouping of firms 
that are specific to training, external relations and personnel management practices.  
Next, the results of the cluster analysis are used to test for the existence of four proposed 
employment systems theorized in Begin (1997) called the simple structure, machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, and adhocracy system.  The results of this 
comparison show that groups of firms created by the cluster analysis provide a good fit 
for the hypothesized HRM systems described by Begin.   
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While the results from the cluster analysis are informative, the HRM demand 
function’s ability to predict the firms’ choice of employment system is greatly reduced 
compared to the predictive power of the HRM demand function to explain the firms’ 
choices regarding aggregate and disaggregated expenditures on HRM practices per 
employee.  For example, the number of independent variables that are found to be 
statistically significant determinants of the firms’ choice is reduced from nine to two.  
The reduced explanatory power of the HRM demand function for explaining the firms’ 
choice of HRM system can also be seen by observing the R-squared term of the two 
specifications, which is 0.474 when the dependent variable is specified as the aggregate 
expenditures on HRM practices per employee, but is only 0.145 when the dependent 
variable reflects the firms’ choice regarding their system of HRM practices.  While this 
result is not encouraging, it is also not too surprising that the HRM demand function is 
not a good predictor of the firms’ choice of employment system.  Indeed, the present 
model is built on the standard neoclassical production function framework in which the 
factor input variables (i.e., the K, L and HRM variables) are intended to relate the 
magnitude of the input and not its type.  Therefore, this result signals the importance of 
the need for a more complex model that is geared towards predicting this qualitative 
choice.   
 
Significance and Addition to Knowledge 
 
The empirical estimations of the HRM demand function conducted in this 
dissertation provide support for a microeconomics-based theoretical model of firms’ 
choice of HRM practices.  Perhaps the most influential contribution of this theory is that 
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it derives a clear connection between HRM practices and firm performance, and thus 
illuminates the proverbial “black-box” that has plagued the HRM literature for two 
decades.  Next, the empirical results contribute to the extant literature by identifying a 
number of independent variables that are statistically significant determinants of the 
demand for HRM.  Furthermore, the sign and magnitude of each of these statistically 
significant regression coefficients communicate the degree to which they each 
individually influence the level of demand for HRM.  An additional contribution of this 
dissertation is that it uses a cluster analysis to demonstrate that there are a discrete set of a 
few employment systems that categorize all firms.  By identifying a few such 
employment systems that exist in practice, this dissertation adds to the HRM systems 
literature by clarifying the “classification problem” that has constrained past research, 
and by providing empirical support in favor of the hypothetical employment systems 
proposed in Begin (1997).  
 APPENDIX 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure A.1.  The Demand for HRM Practices  
 
Note: For the purposes of solving their research questions, Bryson and others show both 
the distribution for firms which are classified as having ‘voice’ and those which have ‘no 
voice’ in this graph.  The study seeks to explain why the line representing voice strictly 
dominated the no voice line, concluding that voice and HRM are compliments. 
 
Source: (Bryson, Gomez, et al. 2007) 
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Figure A.2. Bureau of National Affairs Survey Instrument 
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 TABLES 
 
Table A.1. Description of Sources Used to Populate the Dataset 
Variable Source 
Rate of Unemployment (Industry-State) 
The 2005 Current Employment 
Statistics (CES) survey (State & 
Metro Area) conducted by the BLS 
Log of Separations per 100 Employees 
The 2005 Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) conducted 
by the BLS 
Log of Variation in Employment (1990-2004) 
The Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages conducted by the BLS 
(QCEW) from January of 1990 to 
December of 2004 
Percent of Employees that Have a Bachelors 
Degree 
Labor Force Statistics taken from the 
2005 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) conducted by the BLS 
Percent of Employees that are Women 
Obtained from the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s Statistical Database.  
The specific sources are (1) Job 
Patterns For Minorities And Women 
In Private Industry (EEO-1) and (2) 
Job Patterns For Minorities And 
Women In State And Local 
Government Industry (EEO-3).  The 
White Collar workers are defined as 
the proportion of the labor forces 
working as managers, professionals, 
sales workers, and office and clerical 
workers. 
Percent of Employees that are Minority 
Percent of Employees that are White Collar 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Testing for Differences in the Regression Equation Specifications 
 
Recruitment Training Compen- sation 
Benefits 
Admin. 
Employee 
Relations 
External 
Relations 
Personnel 
Mgt. 
Health 
and 
Safety 
Strategic 
Planning 
Chi2(17) 54.29 56.23 76.42 45.14 26.78 37.10 14.96 35.91 18.38 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.005 0.665 0.007 0.431 
Note: In this test the estimated coefficients from the aggregated equation are compared to 
each of the disaggregated equations.  The null hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients of 
the two specifications are equal. 
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